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ABSTRACT
To evaluate the seismic risk of railway networks, a derailment consequence model and a regional approach
are developed
The consequence model estimates the casualty and fatality rates for passengers as a function of train speed
and includes two sub-models. The first sub-model, which is for the case when the train remains in its own
track after derailment, was developed using historical accident data. The casualty and fatality rates are
estimated using a linear logistic model. The other sub-model, for the case of head-on collision and train fall,
was developed using numerical simulation results by the U.S.DOT
The regional approach estimates earthquake risk for the entire network In the approach, fst, the
probabilities of possible derailment scenarios including head-on collision cases are calculated. To calculate
the probabilities of derailment due to seismic vibration and facility damage, the derailment probability
model is applied After one scenario is selected by Monte Carlo method based on calculated probabilities,
the consequences are calculated for the scenario applying the consequence model developed previously.
Through an application to the Tohoku Shinkansen line, we illustrate how the system is in many ways an
improvement over the current JR East system
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1 Introduction
Japan is a very earthquake-prone country. More than 100 earthquakes of magnitude larger than 41occur on
average every month in 2005. The number of earthquakes occurring each month in 2005 is shown in Table
1-1.
Itble 1-1: Number ofEarthquakes inJapan in theyear2005 (archives of the MeteowdogicalAgency in Japan)
Jan Feb Mar Arp May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
M4-,- 100 70 98 76 76 87 115 112 73 85 109 98
M5-- 15 12 9 10 12 10 16 13 8 13 11 15
M6-% 2 1 2 2 - - 1 3 2 4 3 3
The Kobe earthquake of 1995 (The Great Hanshin earthquake) whose magnitude is 7.3, as well as the
Niigata earthquake of 2004 (The Mid Niigata Prefecture Earthquake of 2004) whose magnitude 6.8, caused
many injuries and fatalities.
The viaducts, tunnels, and electrical facilities of the railway system suffered extensive damage during the
Kobe earthquake in 1995. Fortunately, because the earthquake occuned in the early morning, there were no
injuries or fatalities associated with the railway system. During the Niigata earthquake of 2004, a high speed
Shinkansen train running at 203 km/h derailed While also in this case there were no injurines or fatalities, the
derailment had the capability of being disastrous. In fact, several fortunate events occurred First, the
Shinkansen remained on the track without turnming over, even though it was subjected to heavy earthquake
motionr Second, there was no major damage to the viaducts from the time when the earthquake vibration
reached the Shinkansen to the time when the train stopped
In part, the consequences of the Niigata derailment were minor due to triggering of the Seismic Early
Warning System (SEWS). The SEWS automatically stops the trains as soon as an earthquake whose
1 Japanese Maitude that set by Me theological Agent in Japan
magnitude is over a certain level is known to have occurred. The hypocenter of the Niigata earthquake was
directly below a populated area not far from the Shinkansen location. In this case, the time it takes for the
strong motion to reach the area of impact is short Thanks to this warning system, the alarm was issued 2.4
seconds before the arrival of the heaviest and damaging vibrations, and the Shinkansen was able to brake
consequently. The distance traveled by the Shinkansen was shortened and this contributed to preventing any
serious injuries from occurring
An important mission of organizations that provide public services to many customers is to maintain the
highest level of safety. Even if the danger comes from a natural disaster and not a man-made one, one must
keep dangerous situations for the customers to a minimum.
East Japan Railway Company (JR East) is the largest passenger railway company in the world It has a
7,526.8-kilometer rail network which covers the eastern half of mainland Japan including the Tokyo
metropolitan area, and about 16 million passengers use the system every day. Considering the heavy usage
by customers, JR East should make persistent efforts to improve the safety level.
JR East constructed all facilities including stations, viaducts, bridges and tunnels, to conform to the
earthquake design standards imposed by the Ministry of Land, Infast·ucture and Transportation in Japan.
Furthermore, they implemented an early seismic warning system and implemented seismic retrofitting
measures for viaducts along all the Shinkansen lines. In spite of all this, it is still important that JR East use
more detailed and effective methodologies to assess possible damages and losses to their railway network
caused by earthquakes.
JR East developed a system to estimate the fiequency of derailments and operational delays. There are,
however, several factors that the current system ignores.
First, the consequences in terms of injuries or fatalities cannot be estimated in the current system. In order to
make effective investments in countermeasures, the estimation of the consequences is of great importance.
The consequences depend on several conditions such as the date, time, and local geology and topography.
Conditions of the train at the time of the earthquake are also important (train speed, train load, type of track
support, etc.) Finally, what happens after derailment greatly affects the consequences. For example, the
number of casualties depends on whether the train remains standing on the track or turns over, whether it
falls from significant height or collide with an incoming train, etc. All possible conditions should be taken
into account in assessing the possible range of consequences.
The current system assumes that the Shinkansen trains run on viaducts. However, there are also bridges,
tunnels and embankments on the Shinkansen tracks. The difference in vibration level and damage for
different track conditions should be considered In the Niigata case, it was reported that one of the significant
causes of derailment was the phase difference in the seismic vibration of adjacent viaducts (Nakamura,
2005).
In order to estimate the earthquake risk for the entire JR East network (not just for each line segment in
isolation from the rest of the system), it was decided to address three main issues.
1 Develop an improved Earthquake Derailment Model considering mutual effects of different
soil and infastructure conditions.
2 Develop a Consequence Model: The consequence model focuses on the estimation of
casualties and fatalities including all major post-derailment scenarios such as overturing,
falling, and intrusion, as well as train speed
3 Develop a Regional Approach to risk evaluation: The regional approach estimates the
system-wide rates of derailment and consequences by combining a seismicity model with
the earthquake derailment and consequence models mentioned above.
This study focuses on objectives 2 and 3.
In chapter 2, we discuss the Consequence Model. The model consists of two sub-models. First we explain
the development of the Derailment on Own Track Model by examining the actual derailment data. Second,
we define the Collision and Train Fall Model produced by the numerical simulation results. Associating
these sub-models, the consequences of most of all possible scenarios after derailment can be estimated
10
In chapter 3, we describe the Regional Approach to risk evaluation. In the model, associating the derailment
model and the consequence model that we mentioned above, and using real databases such as train
timetable, land registers, etc, the derailment risk in the entire network can be simulated First we explain the
calculation flow and methodologies of this approach Second, we try to compare the results between the
current system of JR East and the new developed system Third, we demonstrate the new system for the
Tohoku Shinkansen line to confirm the ability of the new system.
2 Model ofDerailment Consequences
In this chapter, we will discuss the development of a model to estimate the severity of consequences caused
by derailments. The consequences, in terms of the number of casualties and fatalities, are not predicted by
the "Shinkansen Earthquake Impact Assessment System" (Shimamura et al. 2006) currently in use by the
East Japan Railway Company (JR East). Losses are influenced by pre- or post-derailment conditions. For
example, if many passengers are on a derailing train, the number of casualties and fatalities is necessarily
higher than if fewer passengers are on board If the derailed train runs at a higher speed, the train might not
be able to remain on the track and the losses would also increase.
First, we use a derailment data set compiled by SRI Intemational (Klopp et al., 1996) to quantify the effects
on the number of minor injuries, serious injuries, and fatalities of various conditions at the time of derailment
as well as the occurrence of secondary accidents such as turnover, train falling or intrusion. Then, we
develop a Collision Model to estimate the number of casualties and fatalities in the cases of head collision
with an incoming train and fall from a viaduct following derailment
First, we used the SRI Intemrnational study to compile a data set of train derailment that includes train speed,
secondary accidents after derailmenit track conditions, and other variables. After derailment, the train cannot
run smoothly and can cause injury to passengers. If the train does not overturn and stops in a relatively safe
manner, the losses are far lower than if the train overtums after derailment In commenting on their own data
of derailment events in the U.S., SRI Intemational noted that "although the number of injuries tends to
increase with speed, the number of injuries is not a simple function of the train speed." They further
remarked that "derailment accidents in which many injuries occurred typically involved circumstances in
which the train cars did not remain in lines and upright but instead jackknifed, overturned, or collided with
other cars or track-side objects." As an anecdotal validation of this statement, one may observe that during
the Niigata earthquake, even though the derailed Shinkansen was running at 203km/h when the earthquake
occurred, there were no injuries or fatalities because the train remained standing on the track until it stopped
Secondary accidents after derailment, such as turnover, falling or collision with nearby structures or with
incoming trains can have large effects on the number of casualties and fatalities. Therefore, derailment cases
were classified according to types of secondary accidents. Derailments that occurred in a curve were also
noted, because it is more difficult that a derailed train remains upright if derailment occurs in a curve than in
a straight line segment
We used the compiled data set to investigate the dependence of the number of casualties and fatalities on
train speed at the time of derailment and on other factors as indicated above. The model we use is the linear
logistic type, meaning that the logit of the loss variable of interest is assumed to depend linearly on various
regressions, see section 2.2.
The SRI International data does not allow one to assess the loss effects of collision with other train or fall
from significant heights. To quantify their effects, we develop a separate "Collision Model" and "Falling
Model" with focus on head injuries. Specifically, we investigate the connection between the Head Injury
Criterion (HIC) and damage to occupants in a train that collides with other trains or fall from different
heights.
In this chapter, we discuss following topics.
* Development of Consequence Model
> Available derailment consequence data
> Data analysis
> Results of Logistic analysis
* Consequence Model for Collision and Falling
> Occupant space lost
> Secondary Impact velocity
> Development of the collision and falling model by combination of sub-models
2.1 Available Derailment Consequence Data
SRI International (1996) considered 71 passenger train accidents in the U.S. First we reviewed their accident
reports such as train speed, train operating environment, and surrounding conditions at the time of the
accident The database includes not only derailments, but also other accidents such as fire and collision. The
number of casualties is divided into three categories: fatal, serious and minor. From the 71 cases, we
extracted 30 derailment cases and used them for quantitative analysis. We also included two derailment
accidents that occurred recently in Japan Table 2-1 shows the data for all 32 accidents.
lble 2-1: Deraiknent Data Investigaied by SI i nte dtional
Train Speed No. csualties and fatalities Secondary Accidents
Ref#i Date/time DOm/hJ Total Fatal Serious Minor Overtu Fallin Collision Curve
1 1995 Oct 9 1:40 80 268 1 12 88 0
3 1994 May 16 4:36 120 438 1 1 120
5 1993 Sep 22 2:53 117 220 47 4 101 0 0
7 1991 Jun 31 5:01 128 429 8 12 65
8 1991 Dec 17 11:25 115 182 0 11 50
9 1990 Apr 23 13:26 124 365 0 1 85
10 1990 Mar 7 8:21 53 182 4 6 153 ,
12 1988 Aug 5 15:15 127 368 0 6 100
13 1988 Jan 29 12:36 140 143 0 2 23
18 1986 Oct 9 12:21 112 233 1 2 28
19 1986 May 18 14:09 95 1006 0 19 158
23a 1984 May 29 18:40 60 153 0 4 19
23b 1985 Apr 16 19:25 48 146 0 16 21
24 1985 May 15 10:11 12 157 0 0 72 0
25 1984 Jul 7 6:50 97 294 5 29 50 0
28 1984 Mar 17 17:27 25 1503 0 0 19
29 1984 Mar 5 18:45 127 293 0 13 52
30 1983 Nov 12 10:09 115 162 4 25 47 0
31 1978 Feb 24 2:10 72 534 0 1 25
32 1983 Apr 3 5:55 77 349 0 0 24
34 1982 Jun 15 3:15 118 315 1 16 11
35 1982 Jan 13 16:30 17 1323 3 5 20 0
38 1981 May 26 12:30 122 150 0 2 13
40 1980 Cot 30 20:37 102 108 0 1 5
45 1980 Mar 14 16-00 60 190 0 35 80 0 0
47 1978 Feb 24 2:10 72 534 0 0 25
48 1979 Oct 2 6:10 125 177 2 59 63
49 1978 Dec 12 16:06 32 103 0 0 23 0
50 1979 Mar 28 17:50 120 109 0 15 33
56 1977 Jan 16 4:15 70 129 0 3 73 0
JR1 2004 Oct 23 5:56 203 151 0 0 0
JR2 2005 Dec 26 19:14 105 40 5 10 22 0 0
The database includes three consequence categories - minor injuries, serious injuries and fatalities. The
number of minor injuries tends to prevail, followed by serious injuries and finally by fatalities; see Figure
2-1.
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Figure 2-2 shows the casualty ratio (the number of all casualties or fatalities divided by the total number of
passengers) as a function of train speed A distinction is made between cases with no secondary accidents
(diamonds) and cases in which a secondary accident occurred after derailment (triangles). Secondary
accidents include turnover, falling and intrusion with sidewall. Clearly, the casualty rate is lower in the case
of no secondary accident For example, in case 10, the train ran at low speed, 53km/h, but the total casualty
ratio was about 90%. This accident occuned on a subway and the train intruded into the sidewall. In case 45,
although the train was also running at low speed, the train turned over after derailing because the accident
occurred on a curve. The casualty ratio in that case was over 60%. By contract, in case 13 the train was
running at 140km/h (the highest speed in the database), but the casualty ratio was less than 20%. In general,
high speed accidents with a low casualty ratio are cases in which the train remained on the track without
secondary accidents occurring
There were two accidents that occunred on the JR East network that are also good examples to show the
effect of secondary accidents on the casualty rate. One is the Niigata earthquake of 2004 which was
commented earlier. The second case is a conventional train that derailed due to a downburst (a strong local
wind) in 2005. In that case the train was running at 100Ikm/h, and collided with a nearby house. Five people
were killed and 32 people were injured. From these observations, one concludes that secondary accidents
contnribute significantly to the number of casualties and fatalities
Some basic accident statistics are given in Table 2-2. The empirical probability of severe secondary
accidents without considering train speed or other conditions is 9 / 32 = 0.281.
In the SRI database, train speeds range from 12 to 140 km/h, but the Shinkansen can run well over 200
km/h and much higher speeds are planned for the fuiture. In order to use the Shinkansen at speeds over 360
km/h in service, JR East made test runs of two prototype trains starting in 2005. At these high speeds,
depending on track conditions such as curve or tilt, we expect that secondary accidents may occur at a
higher rate. The empirical probability of secondary accidents plus accidents on a curve was (9 + 5) / 32=
0.438.
The data unexpectedly indicates that the number of derailments without severe accidents increases as the
train speed increases. This is probably due to small sample size.
'ble 2-2: Itemied SecondaryAcidents in Derinment Cases
Total Number of Derailment Cases 32
No Secondary Accidents (Moderate Case) 23
Severe Secondary Accidents (Severe Case) 9
Turn Over 3
Fall 4
One of four is also counted as a "Tum Over" case.
Side Intrusion 4
Accidents on a Curve 5
2.2 DataAnalysis
In order to quantify the consequence of derailment, we introduced a linear logistic model, and used least
squares or weighted least squares to fit the model to the above derailment data to identify the simplest
suitable model structure, we used a stepwise regression approach Before we present results of the analysis,
we discuss the overall methodology.
Linear Logistic Regression
The casualty and fatality rates are near zero for mild accidents and generally increase as the severity of the
accident increases. In a previous report (Martland, 2005)0, this tendency was expressed by assuming an
exponential function, 1-ea. In the function, a severity index and the fimction approaches to 1 as the severity
increases. Here we prefer to work with the logit of the casualty and fatality ratios Rithat will explain in the
following section, defined as:
Logit(R,)= log( )
= log(R,)- log(l- R,)
The exponential function ranges from zero to infinity, whereas the logit ranges from -0o to +oo. Suppse
that Logit(R,) varies linearly with one or more explanatory variablesAXas
Logit(R,) = a + Zk bkgk (X) 2-2
where Xis the vector of the X, and the g,( are given functions of X and a and the bk arameters. If one
considers only train speed YS as an explanatory variable and the logit of RA depends linearly on g(TS)
In(TS), then equation 2-2 is defined as
Logit(R, ) = a + b ln TS 23
with parameters a and b. Then, solving equation 2-2 for Rigives:
ea+ bkgk (Xk)
Ri =iR a+ybkgk(Xk) 2)
Estimation of the parameters a and bk, in equation 2-2 is a problem of logistic regression. Once these
parameters are estimated, the casualty and fatality rates Rcan be determined from 2-3.
As we discussed in the section 2.1, the number of casualties tends to increase with train speed and is affected
by other factors such as turnover, fall, track curvaturte, etc.
Fraction of Casualties and Fatalities
In order to analyze minor casualties, serious casualties, and fatalities, three rates AR are introduced as follows:
RM+S+F
NTotal
S+F 2-5
M+S+F
FR3 =S+ F
where Mand S are the number minor and serious injuries, F is the number of fatalities, and NrTa is the total
number of passengers on the train
Using the rates in equation 2-5, the fiactions of people who are lightly injured, severely injured or killed in a
derailment are recovered as:
F
RF = F RI x R2 x R3
NTotal
S
MRM = R, x( - R2 )
Nrotal
Clearly, the sum of RF + Rs + RM should not exceed 1. If RF, Rs and RM were modeled directly without
relating them to RI, R2 and R3, the sum of RF Rs and RM could possibly exceed 1, because there are no
restrictions on the total number of passengers. The advantage of expressing the consequences through the
ratios Ri in equation 2-5 is that each of these ratios can vary between 0 and 1. The ratios RE &s andRM will
then satisfy R + & + RM 1.
Choice ofXj Variables
Equation 2-3 illustrates the logistic model when only one factor (train speed) influences the ratio P,. In reality,
other factors such as turnover, train fall, side intrusion, or the existence of curve are also likely to be
influential. Moreover, we want to simultaneously model all three rates R1, R2, and R3.The following factors
are used in the linear regression model as regressions X:
* Ratioindexi(i= 1,23)
* Trainspeed,lS
* Occurrence of secondary accidents of different types (Overturn / Falling / Collision)
* Curve or straight tracks
Table 2-3 shows how these variables are expressed.
Variables
XTS
XGMn
Value
=In TS
hble 2-3: Definition ofPossible Variabes
Definition
Natural logarithm of train speed
If overturn occursX u = 1, othewise Xo, = 0.
XS* 0 If falling occursXju= 1,otherwise Xw,= 0.
I
Xinin {0 If collision occurs Xn = 1, ootherwise Xa = 0.
1
XOM 0 If curvature existsA.= 1, otherwise X = 0.
Xi, X2 0 Binary variables to indicate the type of ratio I considered;
(XI, X2) = (0, 0) for R1, (1, 0) for R2, (0, 1) for R3.
Later in the analysis, we find it necessary to replace Xo• Xag, Xi and X with a simple indicator
variable for severe accidents of any kind or for derailment on curved tracks. This variable, Xer• is 1 if
overturn, fall or collision occurs or if derailment occurs on a curve. Otherwise X,,, = 0.
Choice ofPossiblegT) Functions
A function gg9 that depends only on one regression variable Xk is said to model the "main effect" of Xk.
Functions of two or more variables quantify so-called "interactions." A simple way to specify the functions
gk is as follows:
In derailment cases, the dependent factor might not only be one "main effect" but also have "interaction"
each other. For instance, if there are no secondary accidents, the minor injuries might be most prevalent, but
-
Ir
if any secondary accidents happen, the severity level will change, and more serious injuries or fatalities will
occur more often. The severity of accident relates to the severity of consequence. In order to simulate these
characteristics, we should choice of possible Xi combinations as g, (X,) functions.
~- i, O- * Main effect ofX
=ga X- X X XkA Interaction of different order
X XX Xk X * J
The choice of which main effects and interactions to indicate is the objective of stepwise regression.
Method of Fitting
There are several methods to fit the linear logistic model in equation 2-1. A popular one is maximum
likelihood The maximum likelihood method estimates the most likely parameter values by calculating the
probability of the observations. While conceptually very appealing, the maximum likelihood has the
drawback of requiring specification of a probabilistic model for the observed consequences. Formulation of
such a model is quite complicated, especially when there are many possibly interacting regressions and the
response is vector-valued. In our research, for example, the ratios, RI, R2, and R3 for each derailment are
interacting parameters. A simpler fitting method is weighted or un-weighted least squares. In these methods,
one looks for the parameter values that minimize the weighted or un-weighted sum of squares.
2 3 w,[ Logit(R,,)mode - Logit(R,)•,] 2  2-7
=l i=l
where I is the dernilment case number, i is the type of consequence, and the wk are non-negative weights. wh
- 1, in the case ofequal weights. When y, = Logit(R,), Yr1',,pic, are real data values and model is
the estimated y_ e~pica by the model. If R is 0 or 1, its logit diverges and the weighted sum of squares in
equation 2-7diverges. In practice, this happens mainly when one of the Re is zero. Here one can deal with
zero is discussed next
Zero Casualties
In the SRI database, some cases have zero serious injuries (S) and fatalities (F). If S+F or F is zero, some of
the empirical logits Logit(K) diverge. To deal with this situation, one may either use a procedure that can
handle the zero, like maximum likelihood, or substitute the zeros with small positive numbers. Here we use
least squares and replace the zeros with small positive numbers.
To find appropriate substitute numbers for the zeros, the non-zero values in the data should be examined,
since the artificial ratios R& using the substitute values should not exceed the ratios that utilize the actual
positive data values. On the other hand, the substitute numbers should not be too small or else they become
too influential on the fitted model.
After examining the non-zero values, we decided to replace S+F= 0 with S+F= 0.2 for S+F =0 and with F
F F
= 0.05 for F=0. In terms of , we consider two values. One is = 0.018, and the other is
S+F S+F
F
= 0.001. The former substitute value, 0.018, is the average of the logit values when it was appliedS+F
that S+F= 0.2 instead ofS+F =0 and F= 0.05 instead ofF=0. (Figure 2-3) The latter substitute value, 0.001,
is the logit value that was set as the lower value than the logit values that were applied that S+F = 0.2 instead
ofS+F =0 and F= 0.05 instead ofF=0. (Figure 2-4)
From these figures, one can see the artificial values are below and not fall apart significantly from the real
values. The artificial values that are applied with 0.018 if F/(S+F)=0 (Figure 2-3), are higher than that are
applied with 0.001 ifF/(S+F)=O.
FIn the SRI database, there is also a case with = 1, which produces an infinite logit. Rather thanS+F
using a substitute value for this ratio, we have decided to omit this accident from the analysis.
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Case of Niigata Earthquake in JR East
As already noted, the derailment of the Shinkansen during the 2004 Niigata earthquake occurred when the
train was runnming at high speed (203k1an/h), but produced no injury and fatality. Rather than assigning
substitute values to the RA rates, we have decided to omit also this event After fitting the model to the
remaining data, one finds that the outcome of the Niigata derailment is not out of line with the other cases, if
one consider that no secondary accident occurred in the Niigata event
2.3 Results of Logistic Analysis
Strategy for Selection of Model
To identifj a suitable simple model, one may start by fitting a model with many parameters and
progressively eliminate the parameter terns that are statistically less significant This idea may be pursued
formally thorough so-called stepwise regression and statistical hypothesis testing. Alternatively, one may use
the results of statistical analysis tojudg-nentally identify the best model structure. The latter approach allows
one to include physical consideration in the process of model selection. The judgmental approach was
implemented by first fitting a highly parameterized model in which the coefficients a and bk in equation
2-2 are allowed to vary depending on the type of consequence i, whether derailment occurs on curve tracks,
and whether derailment is followed by a secondary accident (overtuing falling, intrusion). The model has
the form;
Logit (R,) = a + boXn
+ AaoowrXoe,.,,, + Abover,,XnXrseX.,,,,
+ Aafalling Xfallng + Abfallling Xn Xfaling
+ Aaint rusionXint nwion + Abint esionXrs Xint Punion
+ Aacuvr.,,Xu,.,va,,,, + Abcr.,vaureX,,sXcurva, 2
+ AaxI + Ab1X,X,
+ Aa 2X2 + Ab2XsX 2
whereXs = In TS, andX ~ X,.Xf. and X, are binary variables to indicate overturning, falling
or collision, and whether derailment occurs on curved tracks.
Tble 24: Regpasion Resuls (Codliients and Standan Emnr)
Regression Statistics
Multiple Correlation R 0.726
R-square R2 0.527
Standard Error 1.640
Observation 93
a
Aa
Aa.
Aai
Aa2
Abo
Ab,
Abagwan
Ab1
4b2
Coefficients
-7.105
-0.130
4.215
0.273
0.028
0.580
0.756
1.199
0.661
-17.142
2.054
0.867
-3.597
-5.777
Standard Error
2.910
1.346
3.232
0.866
1.930
0.682
0.682
0.648
5.492
14.359
3.276
8.911
3.006
3.006
Because of the limited data, it is difficult to reliably estimate all the parameters in equation 2-8. The
parameter values as results of regression for equation 2-8 are shown in Table 2-4. "Multiple Correlation",
which can indicate the strength and direction of a linear relationship between the objective data and the
estimated parameters, is not small. However, estimated parameters in some cases are not physically
reasonable. For example, some slopes, Abjuy, A b, and A b2 have negative. This means the severity of
them are decreasing as the train speed increase. Half of parameters has the standard errors that are larger
than the coefficients. This means the estimated parameters are not stable values.
~---
To simplify the model, we have constrained the A a and Ab paramaters assembled with different
secondary accidents and with curved tracks to be the same. Using the X. indicator valiable, the model
becomes as follows;
Logit(]R) = a + boXs
+ Aaseversevere + AbsevereXs Xsevere
+ AaX,1 + AbX 1X,s
+ Aa2X2 + Ab2X2XTs
where X, is a binary variable to represent relatively severe accidents such as turnover, falling side
intrusion, or curved tracks. Results are shown in Figures 2-5, 2-6, and 2-7.
FTgure 2-5: Logits ofR1, R2 and R3 as a Function ofNaturl o~garithm ofa2in Speed
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Figure 26: The Result of Model in Eq. 2-9 fitted by Least Square
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Figure 2-7: The Result of Model in Eq.2-9 fitted by Least Square
ater putting F/ (S+F)=0.001 when S= F=O
Consider first the case of mild derailment (X•,,= 0). In this case, results are insensitive to setting F / (S+F) =
0.018 or F/(S+F)= 0.001 that are substitute vales when S = F=0. At all speeds between speeds of Okm/h to
400km/h, the rate of minor injuries exceeds the rates of severe i~juries and fatalities. The latter rates increase
with train speed, and the rate of minor injuries gradually decreases beyond 300km/h. Note that, as the train
speed - 00, the fatality rate approaches 1 and the injury rates approach 0, but the speeds considered in
Figures 2-6 and 2-7 are far from this limit
In the case of severe accident X =1), the minor injury rate increase rapidly until 501m/h and gently
decreases after 1001an/h When F / (S+F) is set to 0.018, the rate of severe injuries dominates for speeds
greater than 2001nm/h If F/(S+F) is set as 0.001, the fatality rate increases more rapidly and becomes
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dominant for speeds higher than 380k/h.
In equation 2-9, X was only considered as a "main factor" and a l order "interaction" for X. However,
the level of casualties could be affected by the existence of secondary accidents. In order to examine the
effect of secondary accidents to the severity levels, we introduced Xe as other l1 order "interaction" forX1
andX2 and 2n order "interaction" forX X 1 andX X 2.
Logit(R) = a + boXs + AasevereX seve,, + Ab,,,,,,Xs X,
+ Aa, X, + Ab, x ,  + Aa1,xx, + AbXXrsXsere
+ Aa2X2 + Ab2X2X• + Aa2X2Xsevere + Ab2X2 sXse
2-10
Moderate Cases
* Mi
Serious
& +1
Severe Cases
0.9
0.8
0.7
'0.6
0.5
S0.4
0.3
0,2
0.1
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Train Speed [km/h]
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
Train Speed [km/h]
Fgur 2-8: The Result of Modd in Eq. 2-10fitted by Least Square
aRer putling F/(S+F)=0.001 when S= F=O
Moderate Cases Severe Cases
Fatal
C:_•,_ ...
0 50 o10 150 200 250 300 360 400 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Train Speed [km/h] Train Speed [km/h]
FIne 2-9: The Resultt of Model in Eq. 2-10 fitted by Least Squam
after putting F (S+F)=0.001 whenS = F=O
1
0.9
0.8
0.77
0.6
. 0.5
S0.3
0.2
0.1
0
* * 'seo .
*" a
rMinor
i*Seiu
0
- --
Although all ratios increase more significantly as speed increases than that in Figures 2-8 and 2-9, As one
can see, the trends are similar to there for the simpler model, in equation 2-9. Quantitative differences are
also modest
In order to reduce the influence of the zero values, we repeated the analysis of the model in equation 2-9
using weighted least square, discussed in § 2.2. The results are shown in Figures 2-10 through 2-13. The
weights were set to 1 for all non-zero data points, and to either 0.1 or 0.5 for the originally zero values.
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Figure 2-10: Weighted Least Squares Fitting of the Model in Equation 2-9
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Figure 2-11: Weighted Least Squares Fitting of the Model in Equation 2-9
w•=.1 for the originaly zero values, F/(S+F)=0.001 when S= F=O
Minor
* Serious
•, ý -. " -.; - . . .. . , , -
Moderate Cases
1
0.9
0.8
" 0.7
0.6
4 0.5
0 0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
n
1
0.9
0 0.8
0.7
0.6
6 0.5
S0.4
T 0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Severe Cases
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
Train Speed [kin/h] Train Speed [km/h]
Figure 2-12: Weighted Least Squas Fitting of the Model in Equation 2-9
w,=0.5 for the origal zero values, F/(S+F)=0.018 when S = F=0
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Igure 2-13 Weighted Least Squars Ftling of the Model in Equation 2-9
w=0.5 for the originaly zero values, F(S+F)=0.018 when S= F=0
In the case in which the weight wi is set to 0.1 for originally zero values (Figures 2-10 and 2-11), the minor
injury rate dominates for both moderate and severe derailments. This is different from Figures 2-12 and 2-13.
Figures 2-12 and 2-13 show trends similar to these of Figures 2-6 and 2-7, respectively
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The least squares coefficients of the model in equation 2-9 are listed in Table 2-5. These estimates are not
completely satisfactory and indicate that same additional simplification of the model could be made. Notice
in particular Ab, and Ab2 are negative and have relatively high standard errors. Also Aa ,,,and da are
smaller than their ftandard errors. Aa2is larger than its standard error, but the difference is small. 'he way
zero values were treated probably affected the results. Most of the originally zero data are included in data of
R3 (= F/(S+F)). we re-fitted the model after setting Ab2, 4a , dal and daa equal to zero and
obtained the results as Table 2-6.
Against the results in Table 2-6, we setd A 2= -0.5 and A a2= -2.5 judgmentally. A a2= -0.5 is set so
that the line passes through the average of data relating R2 = F / (F+S) without originally zero data. A 2=
-2.5 was set so that the line passes through the center of data relating R2 = F / (F+S) including the zero data.
The fitting results are shown in Figure 2-14. We call this the "Modified 2-9" model.
Table 2-5: Reptssion Resuls (Coedcients and StandanI Enmr) Using Eq. 2-9
Coefficients Standard Error Coefficients
-7.089 3.066 Abo 1.196
-0.289 0.658 Adb ,e 3.018
0.581 0.716 Ab, -3.597
0.756 0.716 Ab2 -5.777
lTble 2-6: Recalculated Results (after setting Aa
Coefficients Standard Error
-7.450 1.344 Abo
Ab,,
Standard Error
0.681
2.920
3.155
3.155
= da, = Aa2= Ab,=0O)
Coefficients Standard Error
1.287 0.291
1.732 0.360
-1.065 0.337
a
Aa,
da2
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Figurem 2-14: Logit of R1, R2 and R3 vs. Tain Speed and fits using the modifyed 2-9 model
with Aaz set to either-0.5 and-2.5
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Figue2-16: The Result ofModified Eq. 2-9 model fitted by Least Squarewith Aa=-2.5
In the case of derailment without secondary accidents (moderate case), the casualty and fatality rates
increase with train speed and do not cross. This is similar to Figures 2-6 and 2-7, but minor injuries are
higher, and serious injuries and fatalities are lower than in Figures 2-6 and 2-7. In fact, results are close to
these in Figures 2-8 and 2-9.
In the case of secondary accidents (severe case), minor injury and serious injury rates increase more
drastically than in previous figures. In the case in which Aa2=-0.5, the fatality rate dominates in the high
speed region.
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Discussion of Results and Recommended Model
- Selection of model and variables
To quartifi the consequences of derailmnent, we introduced a linear logistic model and used least squares or
weighted least squares to fit the derailment consequence data that compiled by SRI Intemational.
In the SRI database, there are some cases that have zero casualty or fatality. Because the empirical logits
Logit(Ri) diverge if there are zero data, we replace the zeros with small positive numbers.
To select a suitable model structure, we used stepwise regression and statistical hypothesis testing. Because
of the limitation of data on different secondary accident categories, we found X., which can indicate the
existence of overtum, fall and intrusion, and track curvature, can be used to reliably estimate the model
instead of precise parameters.
- Results and Recommended Model
Using the simplified indicator variable X,,, we found some common tendencies. In the case of derailment
without secondary accidents, the casualty and fatality rates increase with increasing train speed and do not
cross. In Severe cases, minor injury rates skyrocket at low speed, and then decrease gently. In the higher
speed region, the serious injury and fatality rate becomes more prevalent
We selected Figure 2-16 'The Judgmental Extrapolation with A ay=-2.5" as a recommendable
consequence model. The statistical results of the model are shown in Table 2-7. In the model, the fatality rate
is increasing enough and the total casualty ratio is high enough at a high speed Since it had the higher total
casualty and high fatality ratio, more severe results that might be helpful information to be prepared for the
worst cases can be obtained
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Re-indicated FHgu 2-16: TheResult ofModified Eq. 2-9 model fitted by Least Square with Aa=-2.5
Table 2-7: Recalculated Results (The Judgmental ExBapolation with A a=-2.5")
Coefficients Standard Error
a -7.450 1.344
Abo 1.287 0.291
Ab,, 1.732 0.360
Abl -1.065 0.337
Ab2 -2.5 -
From the obtained model, one can estimate the casualty and fatality ratios, if train speed and the fact whether
a secondary accident occur or not can be obtaimed For example, if a derailment occurs without a secondary
accident when a train runs at 100 km/h, minor injuries would be about 30% and serious injuries would be
about 5% for the total passengers, and fatalities would be a few The example ratios for different speed and
the fact of a secondary accident are shown in Table 2-8.
Mtble2-8: Example Results of Recommended Model
Without Secondary Accident With Secondary Accident
Speed [Km/h] 100 200 300 100 200 300
Minor 0.167 0.294 0.361 0.388 0.368 0.304
Serious 0.012 0.052 0.104 0.150 0.306 0.375
Fatal 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.015 0.076 0.156
Moderate Cases
The distribution of residuals of the recommended Consequence Model is shown in Figure 2-17. Although in
the first phase of this project, uncertainty of consequences is not considered in the regional approach model,
it should be considered when the more precise estimation would be done in the second phase.
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Figure 2-17: Distribution ofResiduals of Recommended Consequence Model
(The Judgmental Extrapolation with A aZ=-2.5)
Because of the limitations of data, the recommended model is also adjustable if necessary to reflect new
data.
2.4 Consequence Model for Collision with Incoming Train and for Train Fall after Derailment
We also developed a consequence model for collision of the derailed train with an incoming train (head-on
collision) and for fall from significant heights.
The derailment consequence data used in the previous chapter include a few side intrusion cases for subway
lines and trains falling from low heights. Hence this data set is not suitable for the present purpose and a
more fiundamental physical modeling approach must be used
For head-on collision, we consider the reduced occupant space due to partial collapse of the train cars and
the impact velocity of passengers who did not suffer critically by space reduction.
For the case of train falling from a viaduct, first we consider the effect of wall collision If the train penetrates
the wall, then the train is assumed to fall and collide with other obstacles. While other more complex
scenarios could be envisioned, we view these sequences as representative to evaluate the consequences. In
the case of falling, it is assumed that some cars could remain on the track, while others would fall.
The sequence of events considered for head-on collision and train fall are listed Table 2-9.
hble 2-9: Simplified Sequences to Calculate tde Consequences
Head-on Collision Train Fall
- Occupant volume loss - Secondary Accident (Discussed in § 2.2,
2.3)
Sub-Models -Passenger impact 
- Free fall
Fallen cars - Occupant volume loss
- Passenger impact
Simulation results reported by U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT, 1998) and SRI intemational
(Klopp et al., 1996) were reviewed and the relationship between the damage in terms of Head Injury Criteria
(HIC) or the loss of occupant volume and the train speed at which the collision occurs were considered This
was the basis for sub-models for occupant volume loss, passenger impact, and the free fall effects. The
collision and the train fall models are obtained by combining these sub-models.
Collision Model
Because head-on collisions following derailments can be very complicated and variable events, it is difficult
to develop consequence model for them using only empirical data. In this case, valuable information comes
from simulation results. The crashworthiness of train cars and the occupant survivability have been
extensively researched (Prasad et al., 1985), (U.S. DOT, 1998), (NHTSA, 2000), etc. The crashworthiness
explains how the occupant volume is reduced by head-on collision while the occupant survivability
indicates how safe the inside of a vehicle is when a collision occurs. Many of the simulations were made
under limited conditions, e.g in terms of train speed and train characteristics. A report by U.S. Department
of Transportation (U.S. DOT, 1998) compares results for the conditions listed in Table 2-10:
hble 2-10: Choices of Siulation Conditions
Relative Train Speed [mph] 35 70 110 140
(Km/h) (56.3), (112.7), (177.0), (225.3)
Vehicle Design Conventional, Crush-Energy Management
Car Type Power car, lt Class, Coach, Food car, Cab car, Commuter
In the DOT report, they simulated the risk for several sets of combination of car types. For example, one set
of combinations has power car as the first car followed by six coach cars. There is one applicable set of car
type combinations for Shinkansen trains. In the combination, a cab car is the first car followed by coach cars.
The numerical simulation yield the occupant volume lost in each car and the secondary impact velocity of
passengers. We used this set of results to quantify the consequences of head-on collision or train falling from
high places. Both consequences depend on train speed
Occupant Space Lost and Secondary Impact Velocity
Following the above-quoted DOT report, we estimate the consequences of head-on collision and train fall in
two steps. The first step considers the loss of the occupant volume and the second step evaluates the losses
from the secondary impact of passengers.
If the collision force exceeds the strength of the train structure, plastic deformation occurs and the occupant
space is reduced, possibly causing injuries and fatalities. Even if the occupant space can be maintained,
passengers in that space may be subjected to significant impacts.
The Occupant Space Lost
In the DOT study, the occupant volume loss was estimated the lumped mass model in Figure 2-18. The
springs have non-linear force/deformation characteristics. Collision into an ideal rigid wall was considered,
and the results were taken as representative train-to-identical train collision events. The relative train speeds
in the DOT report are equivalent to a train colliding with an ideal rigid wall at half speed.
Figure 2-18: Lumped Mass Model Used in the U.S. DOT (1998) Study
Two tain and 6 car types are examined in the DOT study One of the car combinations, with a cab car as the
first car (see Table 2-11), is comparable to the Shinkansen trains. The initial lengths of occupant space of
each car are listed in Table 2-11 and the results of head-on collision are shown in Figure 2-19.
ihble 2-11: Car Types and Inital Length of Occupant Space in the DOT simulation
CarType Initial Length of Occupant Space [m]
Conventional Crush-Energy Management
1'tCar Cab car 23.47 21.95
Following Cars Coach 23.47 17.85
Note that Crush-Energy management trains have crushable zones that can absorb the collision force before
the force is transferred to the occupant space.
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The reduction in occupant space increases as train speed increases. In a 140 mph collision, the occupant
volume of the second car is lost in both the conventional and crash-energy management trains. Collision
energy is first absorbed by the lead car. What is not absorbed contributes to deformation of the following
cars.
Figure 2-20 plots the total occupant volume loss as a function of train speed for the first and the second cars
of conventional and crush-energy management cars. Figure 2-20 also shows quadratic functions fitted by
least squares to the DOT data. It is assumed that the energy of the collision is transferred from leading car to
following car, and the occupant volume loss is also occurred in this order without energy loss. By this
assumption, the fitting of the first car's occupant volume loss can be projected to the second car. Under the
same assumption, we can get the reduced occupant volume for each train can be obtained (See Figure 2-21)
In reality, it is very rare for a train to remain straight as it collides into another train If consecutive cars are
not aligned, the transmitted force by the leading car is reduced Lines A and B in Figure 2-21 show a
plausible upper limit to the volume loss of different cars. According to these lines, the maximum reduced
volume of the lV car is 100%, whereas that of the 10e car is only 0.1%.
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In our analysis, we have considered a train has 10 cars and seat parameters such as the number and position
of seats listed in Table 2-12. These characteristics are representative Shinkansen trains. If the train speed at
the time of accident is obtained, the occupant volume loss of each train can be calculated from Figure 2-21.
Considering the seat parameters for each car, the number of fatalities for each car can be calculated, and the
total number of fatalities of entire train is also calculated by summation of them Because there are
differences of the total number of seats between conventional car and crush-energy management car, we
calculate the ratio of occupant loss. (See Figure 2-22)
Because of the limitation of the occupant loss that we set (A and B lines in Figure 2-21), the fatality ratios of
both cars increase as the train speed increases moderately, not rapid The ratio of both conventional and
crush-energy management cars have similar tendency, although that of crush-energy management is lower
than that of conventional at all speed region. In addition, the fatality rate of crush-energy management starts
to rise at around 180an/vh, while that of conventional car stars at around 130km/h. It is indicated that the
crush-energy management structure is slightly effective rather than the conventional structure.
ble 2-12: Seat Parameters (Simulate the Shinkansem 1Dain)
Cab car Coach
Row number 13 18
Seat No. in a row 5
66
Passenger number 90
(Incl. driver and conductor)
Total(10 cars)
852
(2 cabs and 8 coaches)
Seat pitch 0.98
Cab seat position 3[m] from the head
Cab section length 7.8148[m] from the head
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Figun 2-22: Fatality Ratio by Occupant Volume Loss
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Secondary Passenger Impact and Its Consequences
Another case of casualties and fatalities is the secondary impact of passengers with the seats in front of them.
The consequences of there events depend on the secondary impact velocity.
To estimate the secondary impact velocities, it was assumed that seats are forward-facing and arranged in
consecutive rows, as in the DOT report The distance between the occupant's nose and the seat ahead of
him/her was assumed to be 2.5 feet (0.762m), the seat pitch was assumed to be 42 inches (1.067m), and an
occupant's head was assumed to be 8-inches deep. Note that this seat pitch is longer than that of the
Shinkansen (see Table 2-12) The secondary impact velocity is the velocity of the occupant relative to the
train just before the occupant contacts an interior surface (U.S. DOT, 1993). (Figure 2-23) Shorter seat pitch
lengths produce smaller secondary impact velocities. Since real situations are usually more complex, and
can be envision more severe cases. Therefore, we use the results of DOT for more severe cases.
The secondary impact velocities estimated by the DOT are shown in Figure 2-24. The results for the last car,
the power car, should not be considered, because a power car is not used in the Shinkansen system. The
secondary Impact velocities in a Crash-Energy Management Design train increase with the car number after
the 3d coach, likely due to the force of the last heavy power car To eliminate the effect, we did not use the 5
car's data.
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FIgure 2-23: The Secondary Impact Velocity on a Occupant: Va (DOT, 1993)
Figum 2-24: Occupant Secondary Impact Velocities (Cab-to-Cab Car Collision) (DOT, 1998)
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The consequences of passenger impacts have been studied separately for head, chest, spinal, and abdominal
injuries. Among these criteria, especially, Head Injury Criteria (HIC) are used most often to evaluate test and
simulation data, because head injuries are the most life-threatening ones (McHenry et al. 2004). The HIC
Curve that relates the fatality rate to head injury severity was introduced by U.S. ISO delegation. (Prasad et
al, 1985) Recently a new criterion, HIC-15, are used to evaluate the occupant protection such as seat belts
and airbags instead of ordinal HIC (HIC-36). The HIC-15 is calculated in less duration of 15ms, than that of
the former HIC, 36ms. The injury criteria for the HIC-15 in Table 2-13 were set under the provision of the
U.S. advanced airbag regulation (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 2000).
Table 2-13: Criteia for IffC-15
Acceptable Marginal Poor
HIC-15 560 700 840
Here, "Acceptable" is interpreted as synonymous the criterion of 'Minor injury", "Marginal" of"Serious
injury',, and "Poo"' of"Fatal". Keeping the relationship of these criteria at 50% of casualty and falality rates,
the HIC curve is project to the curves of Minor and Serious injury rates. As indicated in Figure 2-25, the
differences between curves are ratio of minor and serious injuries, and fatality
Minor+Serious+Fatal Serious+Fatal
I UU
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Figure 2-25: Casualty and Fatality Rates as a function of IC
The HIC value depends in part on the type of seats used. The types considered how the back
force/deflection characteristics described in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
Standard (Figure 2-26). The softer seat is used in high-speed trains and the stiffer ones are used in commuter
trains. The padding on the seat is assumed to be 4 inches (0.102m).
The extreme cases of whereas elastic and elasto-plastic seats were considered for each seat type. In the
elastic extreme, the occupant body is subjected to a fully rebound force. In the elasto-plastic extreme, the
energy is absorbed by the seat deflection In the U.S. DOT report also reported the HIC curve as a function
of secondary impact velocity for the seat characteristics described above (Figure 2-27). From this figure, we
looked for quadratic equations that can fit lines of elastic and elasto-plastic seats characteristics of high speed
train These equations can indicate the relationship between secondary impact velocity and the HIC.
The results of numerical simulation by U.S. DOT about the occupant secondary impact velocities when a
cab-to-cab car collision occurs are shown in Figure 2-24, and plotted secondary impact velocity of these
results are shown in Figure 2-28. This figure can show the relationship between secondary impact velocity
C
and relative train speed Referring the HIC curve that we re-defined for three severity, minor injury, serious
injury, and fatality in Figure 2-25, the casualty and fatality rates as a function of the relative train speed for
each car can be estimated.(Figures 2-29 and 2-30)
By combining the fatalities due to occupant volume lost and fatalities and casualties due to secondary
impact, overall casualty and fatality rates for a entire train can be estimated in Figures 2-29, 2-30 and 2-31.
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Figure 2-26: Seat Back Force/Defection Characteistics (U.S.DOT, 1998)
2000
1500
1000
500
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Secondary Impact Ve ocity
).4762
km/h
Figure 2-27: Head Injury Criteria as a Function of Secondary Impact Velocity
~tMn~
Conventional Train
------- 
_ ---,
0 50 100 150 200 25(
Relative Train Speed [km/h]
Crash-Energy Management Train
1st Car (Cab)
2nd Car
3rd Car
4th Car
5th Car
1st Car (Cab)
2nd Car
3rd Car
4th Car
5th Car
y = 3.6178Ln(x) + 5.2494
y = 1.4471Ln(x) + 12.2
y = 0.3314Ln(x) + 15.847
y = 0.2894Ln(x) + 15.9
y= 17
y = 6.0822Ln(x) - 4.9715
y = 5.2908Ln(x) - 5.0934
y = 6.4529Ln(x) - 15.202
y = 6.832Ln(x) - 20.473
y = 0.2894Ln(x) + 7.5
200 250
Figmr 2-28: Extnapolated Lines of HIC as a Function of Reldative i.ain Speed
Secondaiy
Impact oity
[km/h]
Secondary
Imnpact V&octy
[km/h]
.c-
*. --~- ...-a..------- 
-
I i
0 50 100 150
Relative Train Speed [km/h]
Plastic Seat 
f i  Car 
1 
a9 !: 8 0.6 
" 0 5  
$a4 1: 
a1 
0 
0 200 400 W) 800 
~ T n l n S w d ~  
Samd Car 
1 
aB k f 
as 
% a4 El 1: 
a1 
0 
0 200 am mD 
R e M h  Train Speed bhl 
1 
TWrd Cu 
1 
i! 4 a6 
a5 3 a4 
f: a1 . 
0 i 
0 200 400 dOD 800 
Relath Tnin spud b / h l  
Fouth C u  
1 .  
0.9 - 
42 
%a6 - 
'0.6 
2 0.4 
~~ IZI 
ar 
0 -  
0 200 4fn 800 800 
f?d&m Train spud 
Elastic Seat 
Fimt Cu 
I O 0  200 400 800 800 fbMw Tnin Spaad D<mN 
Third Car 
0 200 100 a0 mo 
Rddw Tnin Sped D<mM 
Fouth CU 
t 
a9 
r Minor 
a1 
Fifth car - F i i c a r -  
0 200 400 boo mo 
bkt ivo Train Speed h/l\l 
Figure 2-29: Casualty Rate by Secondary Irnpact(Conventionat Train) 
Pastic Seat 
Elastic Seat
Third Car
0.9
0.8
0.7
& 08 
* Fatal
L 05 I Serious !
A Minor
0.3
0.t
0
0 200 400 800 8
Relative Train Speed [Km/h]
Fifth Car -
0.9
0.8
.
0.7
06 
*Fatal
U 0.5 Serious0 
A Minora4
0.3
0.2
0
0 200 400 800 800
Relative Train Speed [Kmn/h
Figure 2-30: Casualty Rate by Secondary Impact(Crush-Energy Management Train)
56
I F·UIV-I 'l.•',.q.
i
(Dw c1 .o 
a, a,y 12 41
co W U-
a1ffIIII
E
a,
yCL
W
*
a,
d 0
Oý OR 1- IR 61D 1: o
a, m
1 1, 1vITT?-
* ,3
.2 i~
a, UliTnl
r0
NE
oo
p
_o
·r0(03
*.
00
-0 0A m01-
0 0 0 0 0
*WHt '3iWfl"O
E
id0·0
*
I--
a-
a>,
o
" .
_a
bD
Cu
a)
o C
(0
N
EE
a,
a,
0(
0)
'4 .C
a,
·a
0,
0
F
//
/K
II
J
--
From these results, one can see the fatality rate is drastically increasing with relative train speed. On the
contray, the casualty ratios are almost flat except one result (Energy Management with elastic seats).
Although there are the difference between normal speed and relative speed, if we assume that a train collides
with a rigid wall, train speed of the results can be transferred as half of relative speed Comparing with the
results of"Derailment on Own Track Model" that is explained in § 2.3, the minor and serious injury ratios
of the head-on collision model are smaller than that, while the fatality ratio has similar tendencies. In fact, the
casualties and fatalities due to the head-on collision should be larger than that of the previous model. These
small issues are affected by the fitting of the numerical simulation results reported by the U.S.DOT.
In addition, consequences in the development of the "Derailment on Own Track Model" were considered in
a unit of a train, not each of cars. The differences of cars might be needed to be considered
Falling Model
Situations when a train falls from a significant height can be complicated to analyze. Here we simplify the
event sequence of such accidents to obtain first estimates of casualty and fatality rates for the case of
Shinkansen train running on a viaduct or bridge..
First, collision with a wall ofthe viaduct occurs. Second, some cars fall fromn the viaduct to the ground After
that, the fallen cars collide with various obstacles. The speed at which the fallen cars collide may be high. In
our analysis, we assume that fallen cars suffer from the impact individually while at the high speed, because
there is no support such as tracks or walls when the train falls down from the viaduct. The first step can be
expressed by the previous model, the "derailment on own track model" The final step also can be
represented by two sub-models that we discussed former section. One is the occupant volume lost, and the
other is the impact on the passenger's body. The phenomenon of free fall, however, should be estimated by
another sub-model.
Train falls were considered by SRI Intemational (Klopp et al., 1996). In particular, SRI International
estimated HIC values for a high-speed train similar to the Shinkansen falling from three different heights (1,
3 and 6 meters). The HIC value obtained by HIC are 41, 142, and 340, respectively. Using these results, a
relation between heights of fall and HIC can be estimated, as shown Figure 2-32.
Assuming that the train has 10 cars of which 5 fall from a 10 meters viaduct, we simulated the casualty and
fatality rates as a function of relative train speed (Figure 2-33)
From the results, one can see the curve of fatality rate is winded at around 100 km/h. This is because of the
plausible upper limit to the volume loss defined in the previous section. (See Figure 2-20) The fatalities
skyrocket until 100 km/h caused by the occupant space lost After the ratio reaches the limit, the fatalities
increases by only secondary passenger impact Minor injuries increase until around 50 km/h, and then tumr
to decreasing This is caused by the radical increase of minor injury ratio for the HIC that defined in Figure
2-25.
Comparing the results of "Derailment on Own Track Model" that is explained in § 2.3, Fatality ratio in the
falling Model is much larger than that of the former model. Because of the limitation of actual data, we
should aware of the existence of uncertainties, but the trend that the consequence of train fall is much severe
than that of other accidents is convincing
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2.5 Conclusions on the Consequence Model
We have developed a consequence model for train derailment in terms of passenger casualty and fatality
rates. The model consists of two sub-models. The first sub-model is for the case when the train remains in its
own trackc In this case, the consequence relations are estimated from accident data The other sub-model
considers head-on collision and train fall was developed using available numerical simulation results.
The "Derailment on Own Track Model"
The first sub-model uses a linear logistic model of various casualty and fatality rates. The model is fitted by
least squares or weighted least squares to derailment data.
* To quantify the consequences of derailmenf, we introduced a linear logistic model with the Logit and
used least squares or weighted least squares to fit the derailment consequence data that compiled by
SRI Intemational. To identify the simplest suitable model structure, we used stepwise regression and
statistical hypothesis testing As a result of these approaches, we found the X, indicator valuable can
be used to reliably estimate the model instead of precise parameters.
* Using methodologies that are described above, we could show the relationship between train speed and
casualty and fatality rates for two types of accident severities, as defined as the secondary accident and
no secondary accident, in each casualty category, as defined as minor, serious and fatal. The results that
are obtained by various methodologies have similar tendency. In the case of derailment without
secondary accidents, the casualty and fatality rates increase with increasing train speed and do not cross.
In the case of secondary accidents, serious injuries and fatalities increase more drastically than the
previous case, in contrast, minor injuries decreases at high speed region. From these results, we selected
one as a recommendable model that the highest total casualty and high fatality ratio as a extreme
model.
To obtain a suitable model under the condition of limitation data, we considered some methodologies
of data analysis such as the setting of the substitution valuables for originally zero value and weighted
least squares. In addition, SRI database does not include head-on collision with incoming train and train
fall from high height. In order to consider the railway network including Shinkansen system, we should
consider the consequences due to these accidents. Therefore, we developed another sub-model,
"Head-on Collision and Train Fall".
Head-on Collision and Train Fall Model
Combining sub-models that extracted from applicable numerical simulation results, we developed the
Head-on Collision model and Train Fall model. Because of the two different characteristics of seats and two
types of train stcture, four types of results are obtained for each sub-model. The curves of these results are
not smooth, because the consequences are considered not for an entire train but for each of cars and are
gather them up.
To estimate the consequences ofhead-on collision and train falls, some simplifying assumption were made.
- Head-on Collision
For head-on collision, we assume that the reduced occupant space due to partial collapse of the train cars
occurs first; and then secondary impact velocity subject to passengers who did not suffer critically by space
reduction. We also assumed that the collision power is transferred from leading train to following train
In terms of the reduced occupant space, the simulation results of the occupant space loss as a function of
relative train speed, which was reported by U.S. DOT, were fitted and the ratio of fatalities caused by the lost
was obtained. In the sub-model of the impact on the passenger body, the relationship between the head
injury criteria (HIC) and the relative train speed were also obtained from the report Applying the
recommended HIC curve and estimated casualty HIC curves that can indicate the fatality and casualty ratios
as a function of HIC, we can calculate the probability of casualty and fatality if we can get speeds of the train
and an incoming train The fatalities due to the reduced occupant space and the fatalities and casualties due
to the impact on the passenger body are considered for each of cars.
In the results, the fatality rate is drastically increasing with relative train speed On the contrary, the casualty
ratios are almost flat except one result (Crush-energy management structure with elastic seats). Comparing
with the results of 'Derailment on Own Track Model", the minor and serious injury ratios of head-on
collision are relatively smaller than that of "Derailment on Own Track Model" In reality, the casualties and
fatalities due to the head-on collision should be larger than that of 'Derailment on Own Track Model". The
smaller casualties in the head-on collision model is because only fatality rates are considered in the reduced
occupant space sub-model, and the head-on collision model is applied not for entire train first but for each
train, in contrast with the Derailment on Own Track Model in which the consequences are considered for an
entire train unit.
- Train Fall
For the case of train fall from a viaduct, we assumed simplified sequences, although the actual accidents
should be more complex First, a wall collision whose consequences can be calculated by the model of
"Derailment on Own Track Model " is considered. After the collision with a wall, the some cars of the train
are assumed to fall and collide with other obstacles. It is also assumed that remains could stay on the track
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These steps can be explained by the sub-models of the occupant volume loss, the second impact on the
passenger body, the free fall, and the collision with some obstacles. The Free fall was examined by the SRI
Intemational, and it also can be transfered as a sub-model.
Comparing the results of 'Derailment on Own Track Model", Fatality ratio in the Falling model is larger
than that of the former model. The trends, which the consequence of train fall is much severe than that of
other accidents, are convincing
In these consequence models explained above, only the expected consequences are considered In order to
estimate the derailment risk as realistic results, the uncertainty such as the distnrbution and the variances of
the consequences should be dealt with.
The occunences that obtained in this chapter will be used as the principal probabilities to estimate the
probability of possible scenarios in 'Regional Approach".
3 RegionalApproach to Earthquake Risk for Train Derailment
In this chapter, we describe a regional risk analysis approach for the derailment of high speed trains. The
regional risk analysis approach can anlyze the simultaneous derailment risk for the whole Shinkansen
network The "Shinkansen Earthquake Impact Assessment System" (Shimamura et al., 2006) can analyze
the risk only segment by segment under the assumnption that the segment has a train running in it In the JR
East system, segments correspond to electrical sections of a line and are 30 to 50 km long The current
system assumes that the segment consists of one viaduct structure. In reality, there are many trains in the
Shinkansen network during operating time, and conditions vary along the track, even within a segment In
this situation, multiple accidents including head-on collision may occur in different segments, and the
probability of derailment is different for each condition.
To exemplify, we focus on the Tohoku Shinkansen line. In the program that implements the regional
approach, we used the actual timetable and track conditions of the Tohoku Shinkansen line. We calculate not
only the probability of derailment but also the consequences of derailment events.
We explain the regional approach in the following order;
* Calculation flow of the program
* Application for the Tohoku Shinkansen line
* Demonstration of the calculation and the results
3.1 Calculating Flow and Methodology
First, we explain the flow chart ofthe program for the regional approach The program consists of four parts.
In the first part, the date and time of the earthquake, its magnitude and epicentral location, the train locations
and conditions, relevant early-warning seismographs and track conditions at the train locations are selected.
The second part calculates the probability of all possible derailment scenarios. In the third, a scenario is
selected, and in the fourth part, the consequences are calculated Derailment probabilities are currently
calculated using the JR East approach. In the fiture, this approach will be updated using a method that is
being developed in parallel with this research. The flow of calculation is shown in Figure 3-1.
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In the program, we use several databases to select alternative earthquake, train and track parameters. These
include data on earthquakes, the train timetable, seismographs, and track conditions along objective
railways.
- Earthquake Data
For a list of possible earthquakes, including hypocenter, magnitude, and annual frequency, we use the
commercial seismic model RiskLinke which is also currently used by JR East The earthquake database
includes 49,282 events that cover all of Japan
The S-wave and P-wave velocities are assumed to be 3.5 km/s and 6.0 km/s, respectively
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- Seismographs
To issue alarms before the strong phase of the S waves arrive at the site of the trains, a seismic early warning
system (SEWS) has been in operation since 1978. Since 1998, the Compact Urgent Earthquake Detection
and Alarm System (Compact UrEDAS) has been used as a protocol to trigger the alarm. The compact
UrEDAS measures the PI value that is the maximum of the inner product of the earthquake response
acceleration a [gal = cm/s2] and the earthquake response velocity v [kine = cm/s] for one second after the
arrival of the P-wave.
PI = max [log ja x vjJ 3
An alarm is issued if PI value exceeds 3. PI is non-dimention value.
The SEWS for the entire Shinkansen line includes two sets of accelerometers. One set is placed along the
track (wayside system), and the other is placed along the eastern coast (coastal system). There exist 46
seismographs along the line and 15 seismographs along the coast in entire Shinkansen line, and 28 along the
line and 13 along the cost in the Tohoku line. Each seismograph controls several segments of the line. If the
PI value calculated at a seismograph exceeds the threshold value, an alarm is generated and the electricity to
the trains is automatically shut down. In our program, the PI value can be estimated by an attenuation
equation that is used in the current JR East system, as follows.
PI = 0.83M - log(r + h)- 0.0098 x 10-0. uM r- 1.2 + e 3-2
where M2 is the magnitude of the earthquake, r is the distance from the epicenter [km], and h is the depth of
2 The Japan Meeorological Agency magnitude
the hypocenter [kan], and e is the error function of the regression. The standard deviation of the error
function e is 0.45 that was found in previous research (NHTSA, 2000). In our program, this attenuation
equation to calculate the PI value and the probability that the SEWS issues a wamrning
- Track conditions
Available data are also used to assess the condition of the track at the train locations when an earthquake
occurs.
In the JR East, there are several land registers for track maintenance and land administration We use three of
them: the register of tunnels, the register of bridges and the register of embankments. The registers give the
start and end points of each type of structure. These points are recorded as distances from Tokyo Station.
Some discrepancies exist between registers because of the use of different distance measurements To
combine them to one database, we have set an order of priority first tunnels, then bridges, and finally
embankments. In reality, most of the Tohoku Shinkansen line is on viaducts. Although some of the viaducts
are included in the bridge register, most of them are not Locations that are not registered as tunnels, bridges
or embankments are considered to be viaducts. The combined database includes also additional information
on embankments. The register of emtbankments differentiates between cut-off wall and slop. This is
important for us because the consequences might be different in the case of intrusion into a wall and sliding
on a slope. Soil condition data are also included in the combined database. The information is not used in the
present version of the regional model, but will be needed when the new derailment model will replace the
present one.
We can also use information about straight or curve tracks. From one of the track registers, the existence
ratios of curve are calculated along the line. We assume that the existence affects the divergence of
post-derailment scenarios.
As one example, combined track conditions of a short part in Tohoku line are shown in Table 3-1.
hlke 3-1: Examle ofTrack Conditions
Fin 354.26 km to 357.38 km frnm Tbkyo Station (Dining Sendai Station and Fnhkawa Station)
Structure Type START [km] END [km] Curve Ratio Length [m] Embankment Type
Bridge 354.26 354.31 0 46
Viaduct 354.31 354.63 0 319
Embankment 354.63 354.66 0 30 Cut-offwall
Tunnel 354.66 355.14 0.48 485
Embankment 355.14 355.18 1.00 35 Cut-off wall
Viaduct 355.18 355.22 1.00 40
Embankment 355.22 355.27 1.00 49 Cut-off wall
Viaduct 355.27 355.27 1.00 1
Tunnel 355.27 355.71 1.00 440
Viaduct 355.71 355.83 0.18 125
Embankment 355.83 356.08 0 250 Cut-off wall
Tunnel 356.08 356.16 0 80
Viaduct 356.16 356.25 0 87
Tunnel 356.25 357.38 0 1133
Probability of Different Scenarios
To identify all possible scenarios related to a derailment, one can use an event tree as shown in Figure 3-3.
To calculate the probability of each scenario, the probability of each branch should first be determined. Each
probability on a branch is determined as listed below,
- The probability of earthquake consists of the frequency of the earthquake that are provided in the
earthquake model by RMS TM as we explained in the previous section.
- The probability of SEWS is calculated by the equation 3-2 for each of trains that is on the track at the
time of the earthquake.
To take the contn'bution of each track condition to all possible scenario into account, the ratio of length
of each part for the traveling distance which a train runs for from S waves arrive at the train or the train
starts the brakes triggered by SEWS to the train stops. (Traveling Distance for Stop)
- Probability of derailment is calculated by two approaches; derailment caused by seismic vibration and
caused by damage of tracks. The details of these approaches are discussed in following section.
- The existence ratios of curve are calculated as a ratio of curve length for the length of each track
structure.
- We assumed that the probability of whether a train goes to right or left is equal, namely 0.5 each.
- The existence of incoming train is calculated as the ratio of conflicted length that both trains run during
the traveling distance for stop. First, the existence of incoming train within 10km is examined.
Comparing the traveling distance between the objective train and the incoming train, the ratio of
conflicted length is calculated. If the conflicted length corresponds to the length of a selected track part,
the existence is equal to 1. If the conflicted length is shorter than the length of the selected track part,
the existence is shown as a fraction.
- As we discussed in chapter 2, the probability of severe secondary accidents is about 0.28. The
probability of secondary accidents adding the curve case is about 0.44.

Probability of Derailment
As in the JR East system, the probability of derailment is calculated considering both derailment caused by
seismic vibration and caused by damage of tracks. This is explained next
- Attenuation Equation
To estimate the intensity of seismic ground motion, the JR East system uses an attenuation equation in terms
of spectral intensity (SI). For example, the SI value is used in JR East to determine whether to restrict train
operation after an earthquake occurs.
SI value is average of integrated velocity response spectrums (S,) whose structural periods (7) are different
from 0.1 sec to 2.5 sec and a strucural damping c = 0.2. It is said that the SI value conelate closely with the
structure damage caused by seismic vibration.
1 2.5 3-3SI = 2. S,(Tc = 0.2)dT
0.1
The attenuation equation, by Molas. et al.(1995), is;
logSI= -1.64+O0.62M-1.3x10 6r-logr+2.3x106h+0.18+e 3.4
where Mis magnitude, r is the distance from the epicenter [km], and h is the depth of the hypocenter [man].
E is a manually distributed term with mean value zero and standard deviation 0.26.
- The Probability of Derailment Caused by Seismic Vibration
In order to evaluate the probability of derailment due to seismic vibration, former research (Shimamura et al.
2006) used a numerical simulation model of a train Derailment was assumed to occur if the wheel moves
more than 70mm relative to the rails. The motion of the train depends on the dynamic characteristics of the
supporting structure. For viaducts, the fimdamental period (Tq) varies from 0.3 to 1.5, and the damping may
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be set to 0.05. Eleven recorded earthquake motions were scaled to produce 19 set values of SI (SI = 10, 15,
20......100 Kine). These motions were applied to structures with different periods. Assuming that the
distribution of the train-rail displacement is normal distribution, the probability of exceeding 70 mm of
relative motion was calculated; see Figure 3-4
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Figure 3-4: The pobability of Detailment Caused by Seismic Vibration as a function ofSIvalue,
for diffeent natural periods of the supporting viaduct
- The Probability of Derailment Caused by Damage of Facilities
If a train runs through damaged track, it may likely derail. In order to understand the probability of
derailment caused by facility damage, numerical simulations were conducted by JR East using same scaled
historic ground motions as mentioned above (Shimamura et al., 2006). Six types of viaducts were selected
as numerical viaduct models, and four damage levels were considered The definition of the damage I is the
limit of yielding of shearing and repair is not needed, the damage level 2 is the damage that requires repair
on case-by-case basis, and that of the damage level 3 is the damage that requires repair. The damage 4 is
absolute deformation level. The calculated fragility curves of viaducts in terms of SI are shown in Figure
3-6.
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From Figure 3-6, one can see the significant difference between the Damage 2 and the Damage 3. Although
the definitions of the damage levels are made based of physical characteristics, the relationship between
derailment and these physical phenomena was not examined before. Because of this significant difference,
the probabilities of facility damage that are calculated by each damage level are also different critically We
examine the issue later in the comparison of the simulation results.
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In the current JR East system, a viaduct can be selected as only one type of structure, but in the new system,
the several track conditions, not only viaduct but also bridge, embankment, and tunnel, can be selected The
fragility curves should be selected for different track conditions appropriately, and the different probabilities
due to damage can be calculated
Papadimitriou et al. (1995) considered the fact that damage varies from location to location along the track.
Papadimitriou accounted for spatial dependence by using a model with clustering of the
damaged/non-damaged viaduct spans. This is also the model considered here.
Pd_damage= 1- e(NspaN•f ') 3-5
where Pd •dge is the probability of derailment caused by facility damage, N,, is the number of spans, and
Pdage is the probability of damage. In our system, Pw is calculated for each of track parts and Np, is
change dependant on the length of these parts, while Paie and N. are considered for continuous one
viaduct in the JR East system.
Monte Carlo Method
Monte Carlo method is a stochastic simulation technich to determine one phenomenon from large number
of phenomena. After all probabilities for all possible scenarios are calculated as explained above, we apply
the Monte Carlo method for the selection of events to simplify calculations.
A random number, which is from 0 to 1, is generated, and an event whose probability that calculated above
corresponds to the random variable is selected
Consequences
The consequences which was discussed in the chapter 2 can apply to every possible scenario in the event
tree, if the train speed and other conditions are obtained For example, if a train overtums after derailment
caused by an earthquake, it runs at 275 km/h, it can remain on the track, and fortunately there is no
oncoming train, the scenario 6, the rate of miner injuries is 0.252, that of serious injuries is 0.377, and fatality
rates is 0.095.
In reality, the consequences flexible dependant on different situations, such as date/time, the number of
passengers, operational delay, etc. In terms of the number of passenger and dale/time, we will explain a
model later Using the date/timepassenger model, we can decide the number of casualties and fatalities. For
example, if the earthquake occurs on weekday at 8am between Sendai and Furukawa, the injuries and
fatalities can be estimated as follows.
The average total number of passenger = 618.9
The change rate= 1.188
Minor = 618.9 x 1.188 x 0.252 = 185
Serious = 618.9 x 1.188 x 0.377 = 277
Fatal = 618.9 x 1.188 x 0.095 = 70
Calculating the consequences for all selected scenarios, the risk of whole network can be estimated
However, these consequences that we calculated in this research are expected consequences. In order to
simulate the derailment risk more precisely, uncertainties of the consequences should be considered This
will be conducted in the second phase of this project.
Arrangement of data for the Tohoku Shinkansen Line
To focus on the Tohoku Shinkansen line in the examination of validity of this regional model, we aranged
data such as track conditions, a timetable, and the number ofpassengers categorized by data and time band
- Track Conditions Along the Tohoku Shinkansen Line
We arranged the track condition database along the Tohoku Shinkansen line by the way that we discussed in
the previous section In the database, 1535 structure parts are included in a inbound track, and 1576 structure
parts are included in a outbound track
- Time Table of the Tohoku Shinkansen Line
In order to analyze the real situations, we use the actual train timetable for the period from 2005 to 2006. The
timetable covers 669 trains including seasonal and other special trains. Using this timetable and the time of
the earthquake, one can determine the location and speed of trains along the line, evaluate the likelihood of
head-on collision in the case of deailments etc. Trains that are in between stations are assumed to run at full
speed for that segment For example, between Tokyo and Omiya, the highest speed is 110 km/h If the train
is between Omiya and Morioka, it is 275 km/Ih If the train is between Morioka to Hachinohe, it is 260 km/h.
If the train is in a station, the train speed is zero. If SEWS triggers alarm, the train starts braking. The reduced
speeds are calculated for each of track parts.
Date and Time Band Related to the Number of Passengers
When a train derails, the number of passengers on the train affects the severity of the consequences. The
number of passengers that a train has depends on date and time of the earthquake, and the section of a
railroad line. We estimated the number of passengers using the annual ticket sales for the year 2004 and
timetable data. From the ticket sales data, we obtained the average of the number of passengers for each
section, and we also found change rates of passengers dependent on date and time. The mean annual
number of passengers for each section of the Tohoku Shinkansen line is shown in Figure 3-7.
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Figue 3-7: The Number of Passengers par Year
We divided these mean annual numbers by the number of trains to obtain the average number of passengers
par train for each section. The number of trains for each section was observed from the timetable. We
assumed that special trains and seasonal trains are used to meet the demand on holidays or vacations. From
June to August 2006, in the timetable for Tokyo station, there are 74 basic trains that are operated daily and
19' special trains that are operated on holidays or vacations. The ratio of special to basic trains is 0.257.
Although the operation dates of special trains are different, the average operation dates of them are 7.53 days.
Because we counted the number of summer holiday season, it should be larger than that of non-holiday
season. It should be interpreted to smaller numbers to spread them to one year. We set the rate of special
trains in one year to 0.2. On average, the special trains operate 5 days in three months. The average number
of passengers per train for each section is obtained as follows.
3 We count the trains that are used more than 30 days in three months
Table 3-2: Average Passengers Par a Train
Total Basic Trains +Special Tr Average Passengers
x1.2 Average PassengersPassengers 345 days 20 days par a Train
From Tokyo To Ueno 29,606,103 147 176.4 545.8
To Omiya 33,716,573 147 176.4 621.6
To Oyama 39,758,844 147 176.4 733.0
To Utsunomiya 36,195,511 146 175.2 671.9
To Nasu-Shiobara 28,970,343 147 176.4 534.1
To Koriyama 26,083,218 130 156 543.7
To Fukushima 24,692,134 118 141.6 567.1
To Shiroishi-Zao 19,716,151 116 139.2 460.6
To Sendai 19,672,963 117 140.4 455.7
To Furukawa 14,387,429 63 75.6 618.9
To Kurikoma-kogen 12,570,026 63 75.6 540.7
To Mizusawa-Esashi 11,010,915 63 75.6 473.6
To Kitakami 10,753,382 63 75.6 462.6
To Shin-hanamaki 10,476,451 63 75.6 450.7
To Morioka 9,964,520 63 75.6 428.6
To Iwate-Numakunai 4,491,197 32 38.4 380.4
To Ninohe 4,420,801 32 38.4 374.4
To Hachinohe 3,968,345 32 38.4 336.1
To consider the effects of date and time, we assumed that the number of passengers is proportional to the
planned number of trains, which is shown in Figures 3-8 and 3-9 for different times of day and for ordinary
trains and all trains, respectively.
This assumption may not be very accurate, especially some particular cases such as in the early morning or
long distance trains. In the early morning, a train usually runs with few passengers. A longer distance train
should run during some sections in that customers might not have any demands. However, JR East
operators usually try to do their best to meet the demands and to avoid wastes of services when they plan the
timetables. It can be expected that there are a certain degree of correlations between the actual number of
passengers and the timetable.
The average number of ordinary trains simultaneously in operation is 25.6. One can see in Figure 3-8 that
there are two peak time bands, one in the morning and the other in the evening. This reflects the pattern of
commuting or business trips on weekdays. Figure 3-9 shows the total number of trains including special and
seasonal trains. The average number is 39. This figure includes all trains regardless of operating date.
Sometimes the trains operate on slightly flexible schedules, especially concerning special trains, but that has
all been taken intl account. In this case, there is no striking peak time band The shape of the function is
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similar to a trapezoid. This means that the demand in different time bands average out on weekends and
holidays. Based on these observations, we decided to use the time bands shown in Tables 3-3 and 3-4. We
also decided the change in rate from the average rider ship on the time band The average number of
passengers riding on a train within a specific time band can be calculated by multiplying average rider ship
from in these tables.
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Table 3-3: Tunime Band of Weekday Operation
Table 3-4: Tunime Band of Weekends and Holiday Operation
3.2 Comparison with the JR East System
The current JR East system and the system proposed here use the same way to calculate the probability of
derailment due to track motion and the probability of facility damage, but results are somewhat difient In
the current system, the risk is analyzed segment by segment that corresponds to electrical section along the
line (Electrical segment). The probability that a train is in the segment is considered for a random point in
time during the day. By contrast, the new system considers the train timetable and several other databases
such as land registers. Hence the proposed system can analyze the risk more precisely and realistically. The
actual location of different trains at the time of the earthquake can be considered as well as the train speed
From this information, the proposed system can calculate whether and when the SEWS triggers an alarm,
when the train is subjected to the strong S wave phase that can be estimated the earthquake magnitude and
epicentral distance (Boatwright et al., 1986), and the distance traveled by the train following the alarm. The
existence of oncoming trains can be also investigated in detail. For the facilities on which the train runs and
for times from S wave arrival to the train stop, the probabilities of damage are assessed Considering the
spatial dependence of damage along the track (Papadimitrio, 1995), one can obtain the probability of
derailment caused by the facility damage. The current JR East system considers spatial dependence of the
damage conditions based on the assumption that the train runs on a viaduct In the new system, we consider
spatial dependence in each segment that corresponds to a unit of each track condition encountered by the
train (segment of track condition), and the probability of derailment should be calculated more accurately
The differences between the current JR East system and the new system are shown in Table 3-5.
Thble 3-5: The differmce between JR East System and New System
JREast System New System
Set the time ofeart1a Not available Available
Track Support Stucture Viaduct Use real land registe.
The Tohoku line is divided into over 1500
segments Within each gegment, the track support
structure is classified into 4 types; viaduct, bridge
ernbannkment, and tunnel.
Objective ofCalculation Selected segments that correspond to Entire network
electrical sections of a line and are 30 to 50
km long
Place of Train Asegmnt inwhich a train nms. According to actual timetable
Coingtrain Not considered. Considered
Representative distance from Calculated using the start point of the Calculated using the location where the S wave
epicenter segment anive at the train or the place where the train can
stop ifthe SEWS works well.
The distance that a train runs if Distancesetto 1000 km. Assume that the train stops at the next station ifthe
SEWS does not works train runs between two stations
Prob. of derailment by seismic Applying the distnribution of the train-rail Same as JREast System
vibration displacement obtained by a dynamic train
simulation model to the estimated viaduct
motion, the probability of exceeding
70mm of relative displacement is
calculated.
Calculation ofprob. ofdamage Calculated fragility curves of viaducts in Same as JR East System
term of SI are applied to the estimated
viaduct motion.
Prob. of derailment due to fcility The depenence of damage is considered The dependence of damage is considered for each
damage based on the assumption that the train uni structural support that eists
on aviaduct
Scenarios Derailment due to vibration and damage, 16 scenarios including head-on collision with an
and risk ofdelay oftrains oncoming train
To assess the effects of these differences, we have compared the derailment risk using these two systems for
14 selected earthquakes (see Table 3-6). In order to evaluate the risk under similar conditions, we use the
same damage fiagility curves and train derailment probabilities. We also focus on one electrical segment
(No. 49) in the JR East system, and a target train (7900B), which is in the segment 49 at the time of the
earthquake. The conditions are shows in Table 3-7. In the JR East system, the probability of derailment due
to facility damage is calculated as an inner process without the extemal indication of the result Because the
probability of derailment due to facility damage is calculated differently by the JR East and the new system
(See Table 3-5), the results are different In order to compare the probability of damage calculated by those
two system, we translate the results of the probabilities of derailment due to facility damage in JR East
system to the probabilities of facility damage. The comparison results are shown in Table 3-8.
lTble 3-6: The Sample Eathquakes
Serial No Name Magnitude Frequency Distance from Epicenter
to Segment 49
15668 Tohoku Inland 64 6 7.10E-05 12.42
15728 Tohoku Inland 64 5 3.92E-04 12.42
19423 Tohoku Outland 16 7 4.97E-04 30.57
19996 Tohoku Outland 20 6 1.66E-04 30.57
20066 Tohoku Outland 20 5 1.74E-03 42.18
21517 Tohoku Outland 32 7 4.95E-04 51.11
22617 Tohoku Outland 40 6 1.76E-04 47.81
22677 Tohoku Outland 40 5 1.85E-03 71.46
22742 Tohoku Outland 41 6 1.81E-04 71.46
22803 Tohoku Outland 41 5 1.90E-03 68.93
22867 Tohoku Outland 42 6 1.86E-04 100.27
22927 Tohoku Outland 42 5 1.96E-03 110.29
22960 Tohoku Outland 43 7 5.22E-04 110.29
42513 The Japan Trench (Miyagi offshore) 8.4 2.07E-05 129.26
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Thble 3-7: Condition of Caulation
JR East System The New System
Timne ofthe eartruake Not applicable 11:01 am
Focus ofcalculation Segment 49 Train 7900B
From 286.2 to 303.3 kan from Tokyo Leave Sendai at 10:50am for Tokyo at
Between Shiroisi-Zao station and 12:40am
Shin-Tsukinoki SST At 11:00am, 7900B is in Segment 49
Track conditions Viaduct Viaduct
Horizontal natmul period ofviaduct = 0.4 [s] , Horizontal natural period ofviaduct = 0.4 [s]
Use two frag~ty curves, Damage Level 2 and Damag Leve 3
Fragility for train derailment The fiagility cutve of the Ogishima R14 The fragility curve of the Ogishima R14
viaduct (Natural peiod = 0.401) viaduct (Natural peiod = 0.401)
hble 3-8: Comparison of Pobabites of damage and dewilmet by Vibration
acoding to JREast System and New System
biliRe of Deraeikrt bty Vratia Rzbility of Faility DB e
DrrlErn LP~el 2 trD,, Lel 3Earthxke Na JR East Sstem New SsbemD L 2 L 3
JR East S m Nw st JR East ttm New Sjtem
15668 801E-04 1.47E-03 Z69EHe 538E-(2 1.63E-04 260E-04
1572i 0 1.23-07 206E 1.17E-04 0 223E-08
19423 &85E04 M56-04 351E-02 324E-02 1.86E-03 1.14E-04
19996 0 9.37E-13 0 332E-08 0 264E-13
20066 0 62E-23 0 4.45-14 0 232E-21
21517 0 6E-0 1.11E-04 216E-04 0 544E-08
22617 0 257E-06 886E-04 &97E-04 1.38E-08 4.4,-07
2267 0 510E-12 0 1.10E-07 0 133E-12
22742 0 4.41E-08 alSE-o5 583E-0 0 820E-09
22803 0 50EE-14 0 4.19--0 0 1.66E-14
22867 0 9.78E-10 5.3E-07 429E-06 0 20E-10
22927 0 &76E-17 0 384E-11 0 329E-17
22960 l26-05 5&SE-M 724E-03 &768E-03 331E-06 _9_5_E-
42513 7.36E-02 575E-02 4.3E-02 4.33E--01 1.39E-0 1.15E-Q2
In the JR East system, the results are rounded off at the eighth decimal place, and if the result is less than
1.0e-8, it is regarded as zero probability. The probability of derailment caused by seismic vibration and the
probability of facility damage are obtained in the same ways in the JR East and the new system. Although
the trends of the results are similar, there are some differences between the results. This is mainly because of
the difference in the assumed distance between the epicenter and the train on track In the JR East system,
the representative distance is the minimum distance from the epicenter to the segment In the new system,
the distance is calculated using the actual timetable.
Next we consider the probability of derailment due to the train running on damaged tracks. The traveled
distance depends on when the SEWS triggers, which determines the location and initial speed of the train
before breaking In order to compare results under same conditions, it is assumed that the train runs at the
highest speed, 275 km/h, and it starts to brake at the time of S wave arrival. Under this assumption, the
traveled distance after the S wave arrival is 3890 m. It is also assumed that the span is 50m, which is the
value assumed in the JR East system. The number of span is 77.8. As we discussed before, the spatial
dependence should be considered for precise calculation of facility damage. In equation 3-5, the dependence
can be indicated as a function of the number of spans. The probabilities of derailment due to facility damage
under these assumptions are shown in Table 3-9. Using the assumed earthquake frequencies, one can also
evaluate the annual rate of occunrrence of derailments; see Table 3-10.
ible 3-9: Probrity of Drabnent Due to Faclity Damage
(traveled distamm nce= 3890 m, span = 50m)
Probability of Facility Damage
Earthquake No. Damage Level 2 Damage Level 3
JR East System New System JR East System New System
15668 0.877 0.985 0.013 0.020
15728 0.002 0.009 0 1.736E-06
19423 0.935 0.919 0.135 0.009
19996 0 2.580E-06 0 2.055E-11
20066 0 3.465E-12 0 0.000E+00
21517 0.009 0.017 0 4.236E-06
22617 0.067 0.067 1.07542E-06 3.458E-05
22677 0 8.526E-06 0 1.033E-10
22742 0.002 0.005 0 6.383E-07
22803 0 3.259E-07 0 1.290E-12
22867 4.16678E-05 0.000 0 1.594E-08
22927 0 2.988E-09 0 2.554E-15
22960 0.431 0.409 0.000 0.001
42513 0.965 1.000 0.661 0.592
ble 3-10: TheAnnual Rate of ncidence of the Derailment Events
The Annual Rate of Incidence of The Derailment
Earthquake No. Frequency of EQ x Ptobability of derailment
Damage Level 2 Damage Level 3
JR East System New System JR East System New System
15668 6.23E-05 7.00E-05 9.49E-07 1.53E-06
15728 6.30E-07 3.55E-06 0 7.29E-10
19423 4.65E-04 4.58E-04 6.75E-05 4.70E-06
19996 0 4.28E-10 0 3.56E-15
20066 0 6.03E-15 0 1.09E-25
21517 4.25E-06 8.24E-06 0 2.25E-09
22617 1.17E-05 1.19E-05 1.89E-10 6.54E-09
22677 0 1.58E-08 0 2.00E-13
22742 4.48E-07 8.20E-07 0 1.24E-10
22803 0 6.20E-10 0 2.55E-15
22867 7.76E-09 6.21E-08 0 3.15E-12
22927 0 5.84E-12 0 5.13E-18
22960 2.25E-04 2.14E-04 1.48E-07 4.17E-07
42513 2.15E-05 2.18E-05 1.52E-05 1.34E-05
The probability of derailment caused by facility damage level 2 is significantly higher than that of damage
level 3 (See Table 3-9). The differences are over two digits. For example, In the case of the earthquake
15668, the probability of damage level 2 in JR East system is 0.877 and that of damage level 3 is 0.013.
Same probability of damage level 2 in the new system is 0.985 and that of level 3 is 0.02. No. 42513, which
has the highest magnitude among the considered earthquakes, the probability of derailment caused by
facility damage at level 2 is almost 1. By comparison, most probabilities of derailment due to facility
damage at level 3 are nearly 0. It can be considered to be affected by the difference of fragility curves
(Figure 3-6). In Figure 3-6, the fragility curves of damage level 2 raise around 30 kine and approaches 1
around 40 kine. On the contrary, the fragility curves of damage level 2 are almost flat and never approach 1.
In the JR East research, the span length is currently set at 50m, but according to the drawings of viaducts, the
actual span length is about 10m. If we use the span length 10m, the probabilities of derailment due to facility
damage increase significantly. This is shown in Table 3-11.
In Table 3-11, some of the results of damage level 2 approach 1. This means that, if the earthquake occurs,
derailment occurs almost surely. By contrast, the probabilities for damage level 3 are still small, except for
earthquake No. 42513. Damage level 2 is damage that requires repair on case-by-case basis, whereas
damage level 3 always requires repair The relationship between the damage levels and whether derailment
occurs is not distinct The relationship should be investigated and a fragility curves that is intermediate
between current level 2 and level3 should be developed.
bMe 3-11: Pnbabilty ofDeraiument due to Facility Damage(Ilaveled diance = 3890 , span = l0mn)
Probability of Facility Damage
Earthquake No. Damage Level 2 Damage Level 3
JR East System New System JR East System New System
15668 1.000 1.000 0.061 0.096
15728 0.008 0.044 0 8.678E-06
19423 1.000 1.000 0.515 0.043
19996 0 1.290E-05 0 1.027E-10
20066 0 1.732E-11 0 0.000E+00
21517 0.042 0.081 0 2.118E-05
22617 0.291 0.295 5.37711E-06 1.729E-04
22677 0 4.263E-05 0 5.163E-10
22742 0.012 0.022 0 3.191E-06
22803 0 1.630E-06 0 6.449E-12
22867 0.000208322 0.002 0 7.968E-08
22927 0 1.494E-08 0 1.277E-14
22960 0.940 0.928 0.001 0.004
42513 1.000 1.000 0.996 0.989
From Tables 3-8 and 3-9 or from Table 3-11, one can see that the probability of derailment caused by
seismic vibration is lower than that from facility damage. From experience and expert judgment, the
probability of derailment caused by vibration should equal a exceed the probability of derailment due to
facility damage. For example, the derailment of Shinkansen during the Niigata earthquake was mainly
caused by critical seismic vibration The train suffered from significant displacement caused by the different
facility conditions, but the displacement did not cause permanent damage to the facility (Nakamura, 2005).
The facility damage that occurred in the distance traveled by the Shinkansen was for the most part due to the
derailed train Therefore, the fragility curves of train derailment should also be revised In a parallel study, a
new derailment model is being developed, which may produce more realistic results.
3.3 Demonstration of Regional Approach for the Entire Network
Demonstration of Event Tree Analysis
If all probabilities of all branches in the event tree (Figure 3-3) are obtained, the probability of the end
branches in it can be solved. As an instance, we explain the results of the probability of the all end branches
for one situation that is solved for former comparison
The conditions considered are as follows;
Earthquake Number 42513 (M=8.4)
Time of the eartlfuake 11:01 am
Train 7900B
Track conditions Viaduct
Horizontal natural period ofviaduct = 0.4 [s]
Damage Level 3
Fragility for train derailment The fragility curve of the Ogishima R14 viaduct
(Natural period= 0.401)
The probabilities of all events in the event tree in Figure 3-3 are calculated using all probabilities such as the
probability of SEWS, the length ratio of the segment of track condition, the probability of derailment,
curvature ratio, existence ratio a coming train, etc. The length ratio of the segment corresponds to the length
ratio of a segment for the Traveling Distance for Stop. The existence ratio of a coming train corresponds to
the ratio of the conflicted distances between a train and an oncoming train in the segment of track condition
For example, the both trains run the whole distance of a segment, the ratio is 1. If one of them stops inside a
segment and the: other runs whole distance of the segment, the ratio corresponds to the fraction of the
traveled distance by the first car and the segment length. The probability of falling is temporarily set as 0.8
for a viaduct or a bridge. The result of a selected segment is shown in Figure 3-12. The event numbers are
consistent with the number in Figure 3-6.
Thble 3-12: Prbabities ofEvents on Branches
Events Probabilities
SWES 0.0093
Length ratio of the segment (Viaduct 245m) 0.1000
Derailment 0.1114
Curve 0.0204
Existence ratio of incoming train 0.3080
Falling 0.8 (Temporarily set)
ScenaricDerailment
No 0.89Viaduct
0.308
I Yes Curve No
0.111
Left (Wall)
Yes Stay on the Track Yes
0.980
Rilhtj
0.500 0.719
Severe Acoident No (Wall Collision) 0200
0.281
No Stay in the Track Yes
0.500
More Severe Aco., Falling 3
0.800
0.092 4
0.719
Severe Accident
No (Wall Collision) 0.200
Left (Wall)
Yes Stay on the Track Yes
0.020 0.500 0." I o.•I o.o.
Severe Accident I  N
0.
Riaht No Stay in the Treok Yea
0.500
Collision 5
0.308
- I I
0.692 6
Collision 7
0.308
More Severe Acc. Falling 8
0.800
582
ao (Wall Collision) 0.200
43&
More Severe Acc. Falling 11
0.800
0.892 12
0.562
Severe Accident
No (Wall Collision) 0.200
Collision 13
0.308
o.aa82 14
0.438
Collision 15
0.308
More Severe Ao Falling 16
0.800
Figue 3-11: Event Thee for the Condition of Demonstration
SEWS
Trains Yes
0.009
No
0.991
I- I
|~ ....... Yes Stav an he Track e
i - .......... T ---
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Probabilities of events
EventO 2.54E-03
Event1 8.26E-04
Event2 6.45E-05
Event3 2.58E-04
Event4 5.71E-04
Event5 2.54E-04
Event6 4.47E-05
Event7 1.99E-05
Event8 2.58E-04
Event9 1.34E-05
EventlO 2.10E-06
Eventl 11 8.38E-06
Eventl 2 9.30E-06
Eventl3 4.14E-06
Eventl4 1.45E-06
Eventl 5 6.45E-07
Eventl6 8.38E-06
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Figure 3-12: Prbabilities forAl Possible Events
11:01am, Earthquake No. = 42513, 7900B, Damage Levd 3 (The Natural Period = 0.4)
From Figure 3-12, one can see the probability of No-Derailment (EventO) is the largest probability of them.
Eventl and 4 in which there are no secondary accident such as overturning, train fall and intrusion follow
the EventO. Because we set the probability of falling from a viaduct as 0.8 temporarily, the probability of
Event3 and 8 are relatively high. EventS, 7, 13, and 15 include the collision with incoming train These
depend on the existence ratio of incoming train and the root probabilities of them. In this case, the existence
ratio of incoming train is 0.308, and the root probability of Event5, which is the summation of Event5 and 4,
is 8.25e-4. Then the probability of the Event5 is 2.54e-4. If the existence ratio of incoming train is 0, Event5
is 0 and Event4 is 1. In this event tree, the root probabilities of Event7, 13, and 15 are even small, and the
probabilities of Event7, 13, and 15 themselves are also small.
From the casualty ratio and the fatality ratio also can be calculated for each event Here we calculate these
ratio on the condition that the objective train and the coming train run at 275km/h, the height of viaduct is 10
m, and show the results in Figure 3-13.
0.003
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0.001
__~
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O Fatality
O Serious Injury
* Minor Injury
* Survive
Figue 3-13: Consequences forA Possible scenario
Assumed that train and coming train runs at 275knh, Height ofviaduct = 10m
From Figure 3-13, one can see EventO, 1, 4, 9, and 12 have no fatalities and the number of survivors is high.
This means if secondary accidents such as turnover, train fall, and intrusion do not occur, the severity can be
low. EventS, 7, 13, and 15 include the accident of a collision with incoming train, and the fatalities of them
are large. The fatalities of falling cases, Event3, 8, 11, and 16, are also high. Therefore, the secondary
accidents include the collision with incoming train and the train falling affect the severity significantly
Considering both probabilities and consequences of events, Figures 3-12 and 3-13, the derailment risk of
this example can be estimated
Demonstration of the Regional Approach
To demonstrate the potential of the regional approach, we consider the range of consequences for the
Tohoku Shinkansen line of an earthquake that occurs between 11:00 and 11:01am on a weekday.
Calculations are conducted every 10 seconds during this one-minute time period 100 possible earthquakes
are selected from a earthquake model that includes 49281 (RMSM , 2003) by imposing that the magnitude
is at least 6, and the epicenter is east of latitude 1350 and south of longitude 430. All trains including special
trains and seasonal trains are considered It is assumed that the Shinkansen trains have an energy
management structure and elastic seats. We set the damage level for derailment to 2, although the fragility
curves should probably be revised The condition of the simulation includes the fragility curves for train
derailment depend on the track system is as shown in Table 3-13.
Tble 3.13: The condition of Simulation No.1 (Demonstraion)
NumberofEthquaks 100
Tnne/Date From 11:00amto ll:01am/Weekday, Evoy 10 sec-7 time steps
Train Stmture/ Seats Enymgnt/Easfic Seats
~Dm Level 2
Fragility Curves Train DIaimet Facility Damage(N&atPliod [s] orPat name) (ypes ofaducts)
Viaduct / Bri 0.4 OgsimaR4 (Type 4)
Embanknint 1.5 Shino-TokoroshimaRll (Type 5)
Tunnel Tunnel Ikenohima R3 (Type 6)
In order to simplify calculations, we apply the Monte Carlo method for the selection of events. Monte Carlo
method select a scenario only at once for the combination of one earthquake and one train A random
number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, is generated, and an event whose probability corresponds to
the random variable is selected.
We assume that derailment and post-derailment events such as overturning, train fall, and collision occur in
the same segment of track condition In reality, derailment and post-derailment events could occur in
different segments. For example, after derailment, a train might run for a while and then fall from a viaduct
or collide with an incoming train However, to simplify calculations, we assume that the segment is the
same.
- Simulation Results
Using the conditions set in the previous section, we performed same simulations as descnribed below. One
scenario is selected for one train and for one earthquake as a result With seismicity represented by 100
possible earthquakes, the total number of selected scenario is 32476. This is the product of the number of
earthquake occurrence times (7), the average number of train on the line (46.54), and the number of
earthquake magnitude and epicenteral locations (100). The simulation algorithm produced 756 derailments
out of 32476 scenarios, so the empirical probability of derailment in the whole system during the iminutes
is 0.023 (=756/32476). (See Table 3-14)
lIble 3-14: Resuls of Siulation (Conditions are indicated in hble 3-13)
The Number of Earthquakes 100
Average of Trains at the Time of EQ 46.54
Total Scenario Conditions 32476
The Number of Derailment 756
Frequency of Occurrence
Dealmnt
R No n4 w i the T*T Yes 12
Sewre A=idert
No (NwM C oni) 14
Mre Swre AcFa•irn 16
Number of Derailments
Event No. 1 1 2 3 4 1 5 6 i 7 8 1 9 10 11 1 12
Derailments 2151 17 1 67 11731 4 I 19 I 1 60 1 56 1 12 1 20 57
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
Event 0
9.77 --01
Event 1 8.62 -03
Event 2 5.23 -04
Event 3 2,06E 3
Event 4 5 33E-03
Event 5 1.23E 04
Event 6 5.85 -04
Event 7 308E-
Event 8 .79E- 3
Event 9 1.72E- 3
Event 10 3.70 04
Event 11 6.16 -04
Event 12 .76E- 3
Event 13 3.08E- 5
Event 14 9.5 E-04
Event 15
Event 16 7.0 -04
1 13 14 15 1 16 Total
I 1 31 1 0 1 23 1 756
Figu= 3-14: Frequency ofOcurmce of Different Scenarios (see Table 3-13 for the calculation conditions)
From the simulation results, one can assess the frequency of various events and the expected value and
distribution of casualties and fatalities, identify the type of structure and track segments that are mostly at
risk, etc. This infbrmation can be used for efficient risk-reduction decision
The frequencies of occurrence of each event that are obtained by the number of each event selected by the
Monte Carlo method over the number of total scenario conditions (32476) are shown in Figure 3-14. In
the results, there are six collision accidents with incoming train, which cannot be simulated in the current JR
East system (Events 5, 7, 13, and 15). One can see the similarity of trends between Figures 3-12 and 3-14.
The probabilities of events in which secondary accidents do not occur (Events 0, 1, 4, and 9) are relatively
high On the other hand, the probabilities of wall collision and a train fall (Events 2, 3, 6, 8 10, 11, 14 and 16)
are relatively small.
Example results of the average number of derailment for each earthquake are shown in Table 3-15. (All
results are shown in Appendix A ) From these results, one can also analyze the annual frequency of the
derailments by a following equation (See Figure 3-15 and Table 3-16)
3-6
100
AD N DIEQ >X EQ
0
Table 3-15: Example Results ot theAverage Number of Derailment for Each Earthquake
Earthquake No. Magnitude Frequency Average No. of Derailments
over 7 Time Steps
124 6.8 8.23E-05 0
125 6.7 9.76E-05 0
126 6.6 1.16E-04 0
127 7.0 4.42E-04 2.57
128 6.9 1.17E-04 2.43
129 6.8 1.48E-04 2.29
130 6.7 9.37E-05 2.14
131 6.7 9.37E-05 1.43
132 6.6 1.19E-04 1.43
133 6.6 1.19E-04 2.43
134 6.5 1.50E-04 1.71
135 6.5 1.50E-04 2.86
136 7.5 1.98E-05 5.43
137 7.4 3.68E-06 5.14
From information like this, one can find which earthquakes have higher consequences and higher
occurrerce rates. Although the number of earthquake is limited in 100, from Figure 3-15, one can see the
number of derailments that most likely to occur is 18.
Annual Frequency
0.01
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.002
0 .Id t..... .......
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Number of Derailment
FIgum 3-15: Annual Frequency of Derailment
Tble 3-16: Annual Fmquency ofDeniment (Detal)
Number of f Number of Annual FrequencyDerailment Earthquake IN 0 x eq
0 46 0
1 1 1.09E-04
2 4 4.23E-04
3 1 1.88E-04
4 4 2.19E-03
5 3 4.76E-04
6 2 4.25E-04
7 1 3.68E-06
8 1 9.36E-05
9 3 2.61E-03
10 4 2.64E-03
11 1 6.38E-04
12 3 1.99E-03
13 1 1.08E-04
14 0 0
15 4 4.79E-03
16 2 2.47E-03
17 5 4.19E-03
18 2 8.09E-03
19 0 0
20 2 3.23E-03
Number of f Number of Annual FrequencyDerailment Earthquake INV x/Z qND
21 1 6.45E-05
22 0 0
23 1 7.27E-04
24 1 1.42E-04
25 1 1.75E-04
26 0 0
27 0 0
28 0 0
29 0 0
30 0 0
31 0 0
32 2 3.73E-04
33 0 0
34 0 0
35 0 0
36 1 1.32E-04
37 1 1.92E-04
38 2 9.86E-04
39 0 0
40 0 0
A eq is the frequency of each earthquake
100
The annual expected casualties and fatalities for the line are shown in Figure 3-16. These expected values
are calculated as the cumulated annual expected casualties and fatalities multiplied by the fiequency of
earthquake for each train (Equation 3-7)
100 7 =n
N= I EQ E EQ ,St,Tr
EQ=I St=1 Tr
where= is the annual expected casualties or fatalities, IQ is annual fi~quency ofan earthquake, NA is the
results of the number of casualties or fatalities dependent on time steps and trains, St is the number of time
steps, Tr is train numbers and N, is the total number of trains.
From Figure 3-16, one can see the summation of annual expected casualties and fatalities is 1.29
(=0.692+0.31+0.289). The calculation was conducted under the limited condition of earthquakes. as the
result of a demonstration, this means 1.29 people is likely to suffer from critical damage by derailment
accidents due to earthquake per a year.
4 f%
IU
Ita) 0
0.692 0.310 0.289I I I - NLI I
Survivor Minor Serious Fatal
Figure 3-16: Annual Expect Casualties and Fatalities For 100 earthquakes (11:00am-11:01am)
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The number of derailments and the casualties and fatalities per derailment are Figures 3-17 and 3-18 for
each track type. Because most of tracks of the Shinkansen line are on viaducts, the number of derailments is
largest for viaducts, but the average number of casualties and fatalities is largest for embankments. The
reason is that in many cases of derailment on embankments the track are curved, and this condition induces
more severe consequences in many cases.
One can also analyze the number of derailments and the number of casualties and fatalities for each section
of the Tohoku line. (See Figures 3-19 and 3-20) The number of derailments is larger in northem area than in
the southem area. The number of derailments from Ichinoseki to Morioka is the highest This is because
most epicenters of the selected 100 earthquakes place are in the northern area, and the epicentral distances
affect the results. The number of derailments from Omiya to Utsunomiya is the smallest but the number of
casualties and fatalities per a derailment is the largest One can guess that this is a result of the total passenger
number.
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Figure 3-17: The Number of Derailment for Each of Track Types
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Figure 3-18: Casualties and Fatalities per a Derailment for Each of Track lypes
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Computational Issues
In this study, we have used Visual Basic for Application (VBA) in Microsoft Excel as a programming
language. VBA provides an environment for programming with Excel sheets and functions. The interface is
similar to that of other Microsoft software, and debugging and help functions are easy to use. Because of its
user fiendliness and flexibility, VBA is a powerful tool for a prototype simulation However, VBA is not
computationally efficient relative to languages such as C or Fortran. For example, running the Regional
Approach simulation explained in section 3.2 took about 20 hours on a laptop computer (Pentium3;
600Mhz, 256MB RAM). To run more realistic situations, one should consider using a different
programming language.
In addition, numerical efficiency may be improved by changing the structure of•he current program. The
current program calculates probabilities and consequences for all possible scenarios in series, without any
time-saving strategy. To speed-up computations, parallel calculation methods or triggering functions should
be considered
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3.4 Conclusions on the Regional Approach
We have described a new regional approach to earthquake risk and demonstrated its use on the Tohoku
Shinkansen line. The main conclusions on this development are as follows.
* The new system can estimate derailment risk on the whole train network. The system uses real
databases such as train timetables and registers of land and track conditions to represent conditions at
the time of the earthquake more realistically than in the current JR East system. Using these data,
various possible post-derailment scenarios are considered and these probabilities evaluated The
consequence model developed in § 2, is used to assess seismic risk
* In contrast with the current JR East system, several track support conditions such as viaduct, bridge,
embankment, and tunnel are considered. Hence, while the probability of derailment due to seismic
vibration and the probability of facility damage are the same, the results of the two systems are
different In contrast to the JR East system, the new system can simulate multiple derailments and
include head-on collisions with incoming trains. Consequences are evaluated considering the
variability of the number of passengers with day, time of day, and line section.
* For illustration, we have concentrated on the Tohoku Shinkansen line and formulated a passenger
number model for that line. The model gives the average ridership of the train in different segments,
different days and different hours. Track condition data are also used.
* Focusing on one situation (one train, one earthquake, at a given time), we could confirm the ability of
the new system to calculate the probability of end branches in the event tree including collision and
train falling events. We could also confirm the ability to estimate the consequences of all events. In this
way, the derailment risk in terms of the number of casualties and fatalities can be evaluated
* We also illustrated the potential of the regional approach by applying it to the entire Shinkansen line.
For this purpose, we considered 100 earthquakes occurring at 7 different times. We then analyzed
several result statistics such as the rate of derailment events, the expected annual number of casualties
and fatalities, etc, and how the latter vary with track type location along the line.
* From the examination of the probabilities of derailment on the Tohoku line, we have concluded that
the fragility curves currently used in the JR East system should be revised Concering the probability
of facility damage, there are significant differences between the fragility curves based on damage level
2 and these for damage level 3. Because these damage levels affect the calculation of the probability of
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facility damage directly, the risk results are also very different in the two cases. Additional intermediate
levels should be included Another observation is that the calculated probability of derailment due to
seismic vibration is lower than the probability of derailment due to facility damage, also when one
considers damage at level 3. It is generally believed that the probability of derailment caused by
vibration should be at least as large as that of derailment caused by facility damage. Therefore, we
recommend that the fiagility curves for train derailment and facility damage be reassessed
Although the new system is operational, there are still some issues that remain to be considered:
* The fragility curves against derailment should be revised. This issue is being addressed in
a parallel study. The model that emerges from that study should then be incorporated into
the present risk analysis system.
* In this research, we assumed that a post-derailment event occurs in the same segment
where derailment occurs. In reality, the post-derailment events may occur far from the
derailment where the surroundings and the train speed may be different.
* To achieve the final goal of the project, the current derailment model should be replaced
by the new model, and the regional approach should be extended to the whole network of
JR East. To replace the derailment model, a soil database for the JR East network, which
is required by the new derailment model, should be developed. To extend the regional
approach to the entire JR East network, all databases such as train timetable (including
train speed and deceleration information), track condition information, and seismograph
information should be expanded to the entire network.
* In the developed system, we make best estimates of event probabilities and consequences.
Uncertainty on risk, caused by limited knowledge of the attenuation law for seismic
motion, the fragility curves for train derailment and facility damage, the frequency of
earthquakes, the train timetable, the passenger ridership, and the track conditions should
be assessed.
* VBA is appropriate to use for rapid or prototype programming, but to produce the final
software, other programming languages are worth considering. In addition, to speed-up
calculations one should consider using parallel calculation methods or triggering functions.
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4 Conclusions
In order to estimate the severity of the consequences affected by the various pre- and post-derailment events
that occur in the entire network, in this study we have developed a "Consequence Model" and a "Regional
Approach".
Development of Consequence Model
We have developed a consequence model for train derailment in terms of passenger casualty and fatality
rates. The model consists of two sub-models. The first sub-model, Derailment on Own Track Model, is for
the case when the train remains in its own track The consequences ofthese events are estimated from actual
accident data The other sub-model, Head-on Collision and Train Fall Model, was developed using available
numerical simulation results conducted by U.S.DOT and SRI International.
- Derailment on Own Track Model
To quantify the consequences of derailment, we introduced a linear logistic model and used least squares or
weighted least squares to fit the model to derailment consequence data To identify the simplest suitable
model structure, we used stepwise regression and statistical hypothesis testing The final model gives the
casualty and fatality rates as a function of train speed for different post-derailment scenarios.
- Head-on Collision and Train Fall Model
For head-on collision, we considered first the losses from reduction of occupant space. Then we consider the
lost that the survivors suffer from secondary impacts with the interiors of the train The sub-models of the
occupant volume loss and the secondary impact on passenger body could be developed using the results of
the available numerical simulations.
Comparing with the results of the Derailment on Own Track Model, we found the casualty rates in the
head-on collision model are relatively small. That is because only fatality rates are considered in the former
sub-model (the reduced occupant volume), and then casualty rates are considered only for the survivor in the
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latter sub-model (the secondary impact on passenger body). In addition, the models are applied not for entire
train first. In contrast with the Derailment on Own Track Model in which the consequences are considered
for an entire train unit, the consequences of each car in the head-on collision model are cumulated as a train
after the application of the sub-models to each car
For the train fall case, we assumed that first the train collides into a wall and then some of the cars fall if the
track type is viaduct or bridge. We also assumed that cars fall freely, and collide with obstacles. Also the train
fall model was developed from simulation results.
Comparing the results between the Derailment on Own Track Model and the Head-on Collision and Train
Fall Model, some casualty rates of the Head-on Collision and Train Fall Model are smaller than that of the
Derailment on Own Track Model. That is because only fatality rates are considered in the reduced occupant
space model, and then casualty rates are considered only for the survivor in the secondary impact on
passenger body model. In the Derailment on Own Track Model, the consequences are considered not for
each car but for a total train In the Head-on Collision and Train Fall Model, however, the consequences for
each car are considered first, and then these are cumulated as a whole train The difference is one of the
causes of the smaller casualties in the Head-on Collision and Train Fall Model.
RegionalApproach
We have developed a Regional Approach to derailment risk for the whole train network On the network,
several accidents may occur simultaneously including head-on collision with incoming train In the system,
the probability of possible derailment scenarios including head-on collisions are evaluated From the
possible scenarios, one scenario is selected by Monte Carlo method based on the calculated probabilities.
Applying the consequence model developed in the first half of this thesis, the derailment risk is calculated.
Using the Tohoku Shinkansen line, we showed here the regional approach can produce more realistic loss
scenarios than the cunrrent JR East system can. In addition, the regional approach can produce often
interesting statistics as the number of derailments for each earthquake dependent on the severalty levels of
accidents, the expected casualties and fatalities for different segments along the line, etc.
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From consideration of the probabilities of derailment, we recommend to revise the fragility curves that are
currently in use in the JR East system, because there is excessive difference between the fragility curve of
damage levels 2 and 3.
We could confirm the availability of the new system to estimate the derailment risk for entire network As a
next step, the system should be improved in the second phase of the project as follows;
- In the new system, consequences can be estimated, but uncertainty of the estimates is not
considered. It would be useful to obtain the distribution or at least the variance of the risk.
- The regional approach should be expanded to the entire JR East network.
- In a parallel effort, the new derailment probability model has being developed considering
the effects of soil and infrastructure conditions, and the spatial variation of ground motion
and structural response. Use of the new derailment model should resolve the fragility
curve issue above.
- Other languages might be advantageous from a computational viewpoint.
110
5 References
Ang H-S. Alfredo, Wilson H. Tang, "Probability Concepts in Engineering Planning and
Design" Volume 1
Boatwright, J., and G. L. Choy, "Seismic Estimates of the Energy Radiated by Shallow
Earthquakes", J. Geophys. Res., 91, 2095-2112, 1986.
Klopp W. Richard, Steven W. Kirkpatric, Jeffrey W. Simons, Donald A Shockey, Poulter
Laboratory in SRI international, "Hazard Risk of High-Speed Train Derailment", 1996
MartlandD. Carl, "Improving Confidence in JR East: Guidebook for the Prototype Parametric
Model of the Consequences of Railway Accidents", 2005
McHenry.G.Brian, McHenry Software, Inc. "Head Injuty Criterion and the ATB", ATB Users'
Conference 2004
Molas.GL, F. Yamazaki, "Attenuation of Ground Motion in Japan Including Deep Focus
Events", Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 85,5, 1343-1358, 1995
Nakamura Yutaka, "Early Detection of Seismic Wave and Derailment", Conference of
Seismology, Japan Civil Engineering Society, 2005
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 2000. Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) Part 571 Section 208, "Occupant Crash Protection. Washington", DC: Office of
Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
Papadimitrio Achillefs, Daniele Veneziano, "Optimization of the Seismic Early Warning
System f)r the Tohoku Shinkansen" 1995
Prasad P. and H. Mertz, "The Position of The U.S. Delegation to the ISO Working Group6 on
the Use of HIC in the Automotive Environment", SAE Paper 85-1246, Society of
Automotive Engineers, 1985.
111
Risk Management Solucions, Inc. "RMSrm Japan Earthquake Model Methodology", 2003
Shimamura Makoto, Keiichi Yamamura, "Development of Shinkansen Earthquake Impact
Assessment System", JR East Technical Review No.7, 2006, P.56-64
Federal Railroad Administration in U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT), "Safety of
High Speed Guided Ground Transportation Systems: Collision Avoidance and Accident
Survivability: Volume3 Accident Survivability", 1993
Federal Railroad Administration in U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT),
"Crashworthiness of Passenger Trains: Safety of High-Speed Ground Transportation
System", 1998
112
6 Appendix
Appendix A: The number of Derailment for Each Earthquakes.
No. of Frequency xEQ No. Magnutude Frequency Derailment No. Derailment
1 50 6.8 2.98E-05 0 0
2 51 6.7 3.54E-05 0 0
3 52 7.1 1.89E-04 0 0
4 53 7.0 3.52E-05 0 0
5 54 6.9 4.18E-05 0 0
6 55 6.8 4.96E-05 0 0
7 56 6.7 5.89E-05 0 0
8 57 6.6 6.98E-05 0 0
9 58 7.4 5.49E-04 0 0
10 59 7.3 1.02E-04 0 0
11 60 7.2 1.21E-04 0 0
12 61 7.1 1.44E-04 0 0
13 62 7.0 1.71E-04 0 0
14 63 6.9 2.03E-04 0 0
15 64 6.8 1.66E-04 0 0
16 65 6.7 3.10E-05 0 0
17 66 6.6 3.68E-05 0 0
18 67 6.5 2.18E-05 0 0
19 68 6.5 2.18E-05 0 0
20 69 6.4 2.59E-05 0 0
21 70 6.4 2.59E-05 0 0
22 71 6.3 3.07E-05 0 0
23 72 6.3 3.07E-05 0 0
24 73 7.7 5.80E-05 11 6.38E-04
25 74 7.6 1.54E-05 12 1.85E-04
26 75 7.5 1.94E-05 4 7.76E-05
27 76 7.4 2.46E-05 5 1.23E-04
28 77 7.3 3.11E-05 5 1.56E-04
29 78 7.2 3.94E-05 5 1.97E-04
30 79 7.4 2.00E-06 0 0
31 80 7.3 3.73E-07 2 7.46E-07
32 81 7.2 4.42E-07 0 0
33 82 7.1 5.25E-07 0 0
34 83 7.0 6.23E-07 0 0
35 84 6.9 7.39E-07 0 0
36 85 7.3 1.16E-05 20 2.32E-04
37 86 7.2 3.07E-06 21 6.45E-05
38 87 7.1 3.89E-06 17 6.61 E-05
39 88 7.0 4.92E-06 17 8.36E-05
40 89 6.9 6.22E-06 16 9.95E-05
41 90 6.8 7.87E-06 18 1.42E-04
42 91 7.5 3.16E-05 23 7.27E-04
43 92 7.4 5.90E-06 24 1.42E-04
44 93 7.3 7.00E-06 25 1.75E-04
45 94 7.2 8.30E-06 13 1.08E-04
46 95 7.1 9.85E-06 10 9.85E-05
47 96 7.0 1.17E-05 8 9.36E-05
48 97 7.5 2.00E-06 17 3.40E-05
49 98 7.4 3.73E-07 15 5.60E-06
50 99 7.3 4.42E-07 12 5.30E-06
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Appendix A:The number of Derailment for Each Earthquakes (Con't)
No. of Frequency xEQ No. Magnutude Frequency No. of Frequency xDerailment No. Derailment
51 100 7.2 5.25E-07 7 3.68E-06
52 101 7.1 6.23E-07 9 5.61 E-06
53 102 7.0 7.39E-07 6 4.43E-06
54 103 7.3 4.17E-04 4 1.67E-03
55 104 7.2 7.77E-05 0 0
56 105 7.1 9.22E-05 2 1.84E-04
57 106 7.0 1.09E-04 1 1.09E-04
58 107 6.9 1.30E-04 0 0
59 108 6.8 1.54E-04 0 0
60 109 7.2 2.39E-04 9 2.15E-03
61 110 7.1 4.46E-05 2 8.92E-05
62 111 7.0 5.29E-05 4 2.12E-04
63 112 6.9 6.28E-05 3 1.88E-04
64 113 6.8 7.45E-05 2 1.49E-04
65 114 6.7 8.84E-05 0 0
66 115 7.5 1.90E-04 15 2.85E-03
67 116 7.4 3.54E-05 15 5.31 E-04
68 117 7.3 4.20E-05 10 4.20E-04
69 118 7.2 4.98E-05 9 4.48E-04
70 119 7.1 5.91E-05 4 2.36E-04
71 120 7.0 7.01 E-05 6 4.21 E-04
72 121 7.1 3.14E-04 0 0
73 122 7.0 5.85E-05 0 0
74 123 6.9 6.94E-05 0 0
75 124 6.8 8.23E-05 0 0
76 125 6.7 9.76E-05 0 0
77 126 6.6 1.16E-04 0 0
78 127 7.0 4.42E-04 18 7.95E-03
79 128 6.9 1.17E-04 17 1.99E-03
80 129 6.8 1.48E-04 16 2.37E-03
81 130 6.7 9.37E-05 15 1.41E-03
82 131 6.7 9.37E-05 10 9.37E-04
83 132 6.6 1.19E-04 10 1.19E-03
84 133 6.6 1.19E-04 17 2.01 E-03
85 134 6.5 1.50E-04 12 1.80E-03
86 135 6.5 1.50E-04 20 3.00E-03
87 136 7.5 1.98E-05 38 7.52E-04
88 137 7.4 3.68E-06 36 1.32E-04
89 138 7.3 4.37E-06 32 1.40E-04
90 139 7.2 5.19E-06 37 1.92E-04
91 140 7.1 6.15E-06 38 2.34E-04
92 141 7.0 7.30E-06 32 2.34E-04
93 142 6.9 5.80E-04 0 0
94 143 6.8 1.08E-04 0 0
95 144 6.7 1.28E-04 0 0
96 145 6.6 1.52E-04 0 0
97 146 6.5 1.80E-04 0 0
98 147 6.4 2.14E-04 0 0
99 148 6.5 1.26E-05 0 0
100 149 6.5 1.26E-05 0 0
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